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THE LONG-RUN REAL EFFECTS OF MONETARY SHOCKS: 
LESSONS FROM A HYBRID POST-KEYNESIAN-DSGE-AGENT-BASED 
MENU COST MODEL 
Abstract 
This paper studies the long-run effects of monetary policy on real economic activity. It presents 
a hybrid menu cost model, the structure of which mimics that of dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium models with fixed price adjustment costs (menu costs). It contains two mechanisms 
capable of generating long-run real effects in response to monetary shocks according to post-
Keynesian macroeconomists, and its behavior is studied via agent-based simulations. After being 
calibrated to reproduce key features of the microdata, the model estimates that a typical mone-
tary shock has substantial long-run real effects, with around one-quarter of the shock being ab-
sorbed by real output. However, the long-run effectiveness of a monetary shock turns out to de-
crease with its size. The key mechanisms generating long-run real effects are shown to be de-
mand–supply interactions, that is, positive feedbacks from aggregate demand to aggregate sup-
ply. The results suggest that central banks should stronger emphasize stabilizing real economic 
activity when designing their monetary policies. 
Journal of Economic Literature (JEL) codes: E12, E31, E32, E37, E52 
Keywords: long-run monetary non-neutrality, monetary shocks, menu costs, demand–











 1. INTRODUCTION 
 Long-run monetary neutrality (LRMN) is a cornerstone of mainstream monetary 
macroeconomics. Money is said to be neutral in the long run if a permanent unanticipat-
ed shock to the level of the money supply does not permanently affect real economic 
activity (Lucas, 1996; Bullard, 1999).1 Robert Lucas summarized the conventional wis-
dom about LRMN in his Nobel Lecture as follows: “… [long-run] monetary neutrality… … 
needs to be a central feature of any monetary or macroeconomic theory that claims empir-
ical seriousness” (Lucas, 1996, p. 666). 
 The long-run neutrality of money has important implications for the practice of 
monetary policy. If it holds, all the effects that central banks may exert on real economic 
activity are realized in the short run. In the long run, the price level will absorb all 
changes induced by the central bank in nominal aggregate demand. Although monetary 
policy may be effective in the short run because of price and wage rigidity, central banks 
should focus on maintaining low and stable inflation rates and smoothing short-run cy-
clical fluctuations, as they cannot influence real economic activity in the long run. Thus, 
LRMN is a core pre-assumption behind the optimality of the policy of strict inflation tar-
geting suggested to central banks by early New Keynesian monetary theories (Wood-
ford, 2003; Galí, 2008). 
 Despite its widespread acceptance, the empirical evidence regarding LRMN is far 
from unambiguous.2 Several empirical studies, based on post-war data from the United 
States (U.S.), confirm that LRMN holds (Boschen and Otrok, 1994; Boschen and Mills, 
1995; King and Watson, 1997). However, it is rejected to hold if the sample contains the 
Great Depression (Fisher and Seater, 1993). The decision to accept or reject the LRMN 
hypothesis is sensitive to the country considered (Olekalns, 1996; Haug and Lucas, 
1997), the monetary aggregate used to measure the money supply (Weber, 1994; Coe 
and Nason, 1999), and the number and location of structural breaks allowed in the long-
run trends of real output, and the money supply (Noriega et al., 2008; Ventosa-
Santaulària and Noriega, 2015). Atesoglu (2001) and Atesoglu and Emerson (2009) 
found evidence against LRMN even in post-war samples from the U.S. De Grauwe and 
Costa Storti (2004) argued that the reason why monetary policy has no long-run real 
effects according to many structural vector autoregression (SVAR) studies is that LRMN 
is often used as an assumption to identify exogenous monetary policy shocks. When ap-
plying different identifying assumptions, monetary policy usually turns out to have long-
run real effects. In a recent empirical study, Jorda et al. (2020) identified exogenous 
monetary policy shocks using instrumental variable methods and applied a local projec-
tion method to estimate the long-run effects of these shocks on real output, which 
turned out to be significant. 
                                                          
1 This paper does not deal with the issue of long-run monetary superneutrality, that is, the question of 
whether permanent unanticipated shocks to the growth rate of money supply affect the level of real eco-
nomic activity in the long run. See Orphanides and Solow (1990) for a comprehensive survey about the 
theoretical literature of long-run monetary superneutrality. 












 If the empirical evidence against LRMN is taken seriously, the need arises to es-
tablish the magnitude of the real effects that monetary policy may exert on real econom-
ic activity in the long run and identify the key channels through which these effects may 
be realized. This paper takes steps to fill these gaps by proposing an estimate for the 
magnitude of the macro-level real effects that may emerge in the long run due to hetero-
geneous micro-level price adjustment to monetary shocks coupled with two economic 
mechanisms believed to generate long-run monetary non-neutrality (LRMNN) by post-
Keynesian economists. These two mechanisms are nonlinear price adjustment and de-
mand–supply interactions. The former term is used to refer to a micro-level pricing be-
havior that does not react to small demand and supply shocks, while the latter is mod-
eled as a macro-level positive feedback from aggregate demand to aggregate supply (Pa-
lacio-Vera, 2005; Fontana, 2007; Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2007; Kriesler and Lavoie, 
2007). The paper clarifies the roles played by these mechanisms in the emergence of 
LRMNN. It studies the long-run real effects of monetary shocks with a hybrid post-
Keynesian-DSGE-agent-based menu cost model. This model combines insights from dy-
namic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models containing fixed price adjustment 
costs (menu costs) with ideas from post-Keynesian monetary macroeconomics, and its 
behavior is analyzed via agent-based simulations. 
 The model tries to “bridge the gap” between post-Keynesian, DSGE, and agent-
based models, following the spirit of Dilaver et al. (2018), Gobbi and Grazzini (2019), 
and Haldane and Turrell (2019) who argue that there is a need for more hybrid models 
containing some agent-based features, while being directly comparable to the DSGE 
benchmark. The model presented in this paper fits into this hybrid modeling approach 
and extends it toward post-Keynesian macro models. Its structure mimics that of DSGE-
type menu cost models developed for studying the short-run real effects of monetary 
shocks (Golosov and Lucas, 2007; Gertler and Leahy, 2008; Nakamura and Steinsson, 
2010; Midrigan, 2011; Alvarez et al., 2016; Karádi and Reiff, 2019). It contains some 
post-Keynesian and agent-based features to make it suitable for analyzing the connec-
tions between heterogeneous micro-level price dynamics and the macro-level long-run 
real effects of monetary shocks. By turning the post-Keynesian and the agent-based fea-
tures of the model on and off, their implications can be made clear regarding the long-
run real effects of monetary shocks. Such a modeling approach facilitates comparison 
between post-Keynesian, DSGE, and agent-based models, while helping to clarify the 
economic mechanisms behind their different conclusions. 
The model is calibrated to match the most important moments of two empirical 
distributions related to micro-level price adjustment, derived from one of the most pop-
ular empirical samples used for calibrating menu cost models, the Dominick’s dataset 
(Midrigan, 2011; Alvarez et al., 2016). It estimates that a typical monetary shock has 
substantial long-run real effects, with around one-quarter of the shock absorbed by real 
aggregate output in the long run. The key post-Keynesian mechanism responsible for 
generating LRMNN is shown to be demand–supply interactions present in the economy. 
The other post-Keynesian mechanism, nonlinear price adjustment cannot explain 
LRMNN in an empirically relevant way within the context of the model. Still, it plays an 
important role in determining the magnitude of the long-run real effects of monetary 
shocks once they are brought to life by demand–supply interactions. The substantial 











in the long run without any limitations; the long-run effectiveness of a monetary shock is 
shown to decrease with its size, implying nonlinearly increasing inflationary effects in 
the long run as a function of the shock size. The long-run real effects of monetary shocks 
are asymmetric in the model as prices are assumed to react differently to positive and 
negative shocks, in line with the empirical evidence. There is an intermediate range of 
the shock size, within which negative monetary shocks are more effective in the long 
run, but positive shocks are more effective outside of this range. 
The results have important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. If the 
long-run real effects of monetary shocks are substantial, there is no divine coincidence 
(Blanchard and Galí, 2007); central banks do not simultaneously stabilize real economic 
activity by stabilizing the inflation rate. Short-run disinflations cause long-run damages 
to the real economy that their benefits might not compensate. Under such circumstanc-
es, strict inflation targeting cannot be the optimal monetary policy. In addition to follow-
ing their primary target of maintaining price stability, central banks should emphasize 
stabilizing the real economy even stronger than in the presence of a simple short-run 
policy trade-off. Two post-Keynesian authors, Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2007), suggest 
that central banks should follow a flexible opportunistic inflation targeting approach if 
LRMN does not hold and should not react to small inflationary shocks. Thus, they can 
avoid causing long-run damage to the real economy. Instead, they should wait for anoth-
er exogenous shock to take inflation back to the vicinity of its target rate. Of course, a 
monetary restriction is unavoidable if the inflationary shock is large. However, they 
should react to deflationary shocks with monetary expansions, even if the shocks are 
small as they might lead to long-run real benefits. The results of this paper serve as ar-
guments in favor of the policy of price-level targeting (Svensson, 1999; Gaspar et al., 
2010) or its state-contingent variant (Evans, 2012; Bernanke, 2019). This policy re-
quires the central bank to target the average rate of inflation instead of the actual one, 
thus compensating periods of below-average inflation with subsequent periods of 
above-average inflation. According to this paper’s results, this policy of maintaining 
loose monetary conditions until the price level returns to its targeted path after a de-
mand-side recession, such as the global financial crisis of 2008, may successfully restore 
the long-run damage caused by a demand shock in the real economy. 
Recently, a few New Keynesian DSGE models have been developed to study the 
long-run real effects of monetary shocks generated by demand–supply interactions 
(Galí, 2020; Jorda et al., 2020; Garga and Singh, 2021). The usual policy implication of 
these models is that central banks should target additional real variables besides the 
usually targeted inflation rate and output gap to approximate the optimal monetary pol-
icy under LRMNN. Depending on the exact nature of demand–supply interactions that 
lead to the failure of LRMN, the employment or unemployment rate (Galí, 2020) or the 
cumulative deviation of the growth rate of total factor productivity (TFP) from its 
steady-state value (Garga and Singh, 2021) may serve as appropriate additional targets. 
Compared to these New Keynesian models, this paper comes up with four novel contri-
butions as follows: 
1. In the cited models, nominal rigidities are modeled according to the Calvo (1983) 
model of sticky price adjustment, which is well-known to be at odds with many 
empirical observations regarding micro-level price adjustment (Klenow and 











knowledge, the model presented in this paper is the first among those developed 
for studying LRMNN, which is based on insights borrowed from the literature of 
menu cost models. The menu cost assumption makes it possible to model price 
adjustment based on more sophisticated microfoundations than the Calvo (1983) 
model. It allows the model to reproduce all important empirical observations re-
garding micro-level price adjustment, resulting in better-founded estimates for 
the real effects of monetary shocks. 
2. The menu cost assumption makes it possible to model price adjustment’s nonlin-
ear and asymmetric nature (Karádi and Reiff, 2019), which is inherited by the 
long-run real effects of monetary shocks. Specifically, it allows the analysis of 
how the size and the sign of a monetary shock influence its long-run effective-
ness. 
3. It investigates the role of nonlinear price adjustment besides demand–supply in-
teractions in determining the long-run real effects of monetary shocks. 
4. The applied methodology of agent-based simulations and the agent-based fea-
tures of the model can also be considered novelties. They contribute to the 
stronger microfoundations of the model and address some concerns raised by 
heterodox scholars of economics regarding DSGE models. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes related litera-
ture. Section 3 presents the dataset used to derive the empirical distributions related to 
micro-level price adjustment and the key properties of the distributions, which the 
model should reproduce. The hybrid menu cost model and its calibration are presented 
in Section 4. In Section 5, the model is used to estimate the long-run real effect of a 
standard monetary shock. The key mechanisms responsible for determining the long-
run real effect are studied in Section 6. Section 7 analyzes how its size and its sign influ-
ence the long-run effectiveness of a monetary shock. Section 8 concludes the paper. 
2. RELATED LITERATURE 
 The research is related to four different fields of the economic literature: post-
Keynesian monetary macroeconomics, DSGE-type menu cost models, agent-based eco-
nomic modeling, and New Keynesian models of long-run monetary non-neutrality. 
 Post-Keynesian monetary macroeconomics: To study the long-run real effects of 
monetary shocks, one must find economic mechanisms that can potentially explain 
them. Such mechanisms can most easily be found in the post-Keynesian literature, as 
post-Keynesians have never believed that money is neutral in the long run (Davidson, 
1987, 1988; Cottrell, 1994). The literature mentions two economic mechanisms that 
may explain the violation of LRMN: nonlinear price adjustment and the presence of de-
mand–supply interactions in the economy (Palacio-Vera, 2005; Fontana, 2007; Fontana 
and Palacio-Vera, 2007; Kriesler and Lavoie, 2007). 
Nonlinear price adjustment: Within an intermediate range of the output gap, pric-
es do not adjust to exogenous shocks; therefore, the short- and long-run Phillips curves 
are horizontal (Palacio-Vera, 2005; Kriesler and Lavoie, 2007). The following are the 
two most popular post-Keynesian explanations for this nonlinearity in price adjustment. 











firms perceive a range of capacity utilization rates as normal, none of which induces any 
demand-led pressure to change prices. Second, decreasing returns do not prevail in the 
vicinity of potential output; hence, demand shocks lead to price adjustment only if they 
are large enough for decreasing returns to appear in production. 
Demand–supply interactions: Potential real economic activity is path-dependent; 
fluctuations in the output gap (determined by aggregate demand) affect the potential 
output (aggregate supply)3 (Palacio-Vera, 2005; Fontana, 2007; Fontana and Palacio-
Vera, 2007; Kriesler and Lavoie, 2007). This positive feedback from actual toward po-
tential real activity can manifest itself through three possible channels:4 
1. Labor force: Large negative demand shocks may increase long-term unemploy-
ment. The loss of skills for the long-term unemployed reduces their employabil-
ity, decreasing the potential labor force (Phelps, 1972; Cross, 1987). An insider-
outsider mechanism of wage bargaining, during which the employed bargain for 
the highest expected real wage that allows them to stay employed, may also hin-
der reemployment (Blanchard and Summers, 1986, 1987; Galí, 2015, 2020). 
2. Capital stock: If firms must face sunk adjustment costs related to market entry 
(Baldwin and Krugman, 1989; Dixit, 1989, 1992) or the initiation of their invest-
ment activities (Bassi and Lang, 2016), then as the demand shock dies away, the 
capital stock may not return to its initial value, leading to lower potential output. 
The interdependence between profits and investments may also lead to a perma-
nently smaller capital stock when firms’ profitability is low, such as during reces-
sions (Arestis and Sawyer, 2009). This may also slow down technological pro-
gress as innovations are often manifested in the form of capital goods (Solow, 
1960). 
3. Technological progress: If technological progress is endogenous, it may also slow 
as a result of a positive feedback from short-run economic growth to the growth 
rate of productivity, known as the Kaldor-Verdoorn law (Verdoorn, 1949; Kaldor, 
1957; Setterfield, 2002; Dutt, 2006; Storm and Naastepad, 2012). It captures the 
weakening of learning by doing and firms’ reduced profit incentives to engage in 
research and development during recessions. 
These effects work in the opposite direction for positive demand shocks.5, 6 
                                                          
3 This positive feedback is often labeled as demand-led growth or hysteresis in the post-Keynesian litera-
ture (Fontana, 2007; Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2007; Kriesler and Lavoie, 2007). Following Arestis and 
Sawyer (2009), I prefer using the term demand–supply interactions, as hysteresis refers to a general prop-
erty of a dynamic system, meaning that transitory shocks have permanent effects on its steady state (Am-
able et al., 1993; Cross, 1993; Göcke, 2002). The possible mechanisms behind hysteresis include demand–
supply interactions, but other mechanisms may also result in hysteretic macrodynamics (Setterfield, 
2009). 
4 See Arestis and Sawyer (2009) for an exhaustive discussion about the role of demand–supply interac-
tions in generating path-dependent macrodynamics. 
5 However, the empirical evidence for the effects of positive demand shocks on potential real economic 
activity is weaker than that for the effects of negative ones (Ball, 2009). 
6 There is little empirical evidence about the relative importance of the three mentioned channels in gen-












DSGE-type menu cost models: The first post-Keynesian explanation for the failure 
of LRMN, nonlinear price adjustment is present in numerous New Keynesian macro 
models as well but with a different interpretation according to which firms have to face 
fixed adjustment costs when they change their prices (Barro, 1972; Sheshinski and 
Weiss, 1977; Akerlof and Yellen, 1985; Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987). These fixed costs 
of price adjustment are usually labeled as menu costs (Mankiw, 1985). They lead to the 
appearance of an inaction band around the flexible-price level of output, within which 
firms will not adjust their prices in response to demand shocks, as the menu cost will 
probably not be compensated by the benefits of price adjustment. The rest of the paper 
will mostly refer to the menu cost interpretation of nonlinear price adjustment for two 
reasons. First, it has become more popular thanks to the success of menu cost models. 
Second, the model presented in Section 4 builds on many insights borrowed from the 
menu cost literature. 
The existence of menu costs is not the only New Keynesian explanation for the ri-
gidity of prices. Other explanations include predetermined prices (Phelps and Taylor, 
1977) or wages (Fischer, 1977; Taylor, 1979), information frictions (Mankiw and Reis, 
2002), frictions of consumer search (Cabral and Fishman, 2012), and the fairness con-
siderations of consumers (Rotemberg, 2005). All of these have proven useful in explain-
ing some empirical features of micro- or macro-level price adjustment. However, 
Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) argued that state-dependent menu cost models can be 
more successful in reproducing the most important empirical regularities of micro-level 
price adjustment than time-dependent models, in which the occurrence of a price 
change depends only on the time spent since the last price change and not on the states 
of individual firms. Levy et al. (1997) and Dutta et al. (1999) measured the magnitude of 
menu costs in large U.S. retail chains directly and found that although the costs of print-
ing price tags are small, there are substantial labor costs related to price adjustment. In 
the case of a large industrial firm, Zbaracki et al. (2004) measured the managerial costs 
of making pricing decisions, the costs of informing customers, and negotiating new pric-
es and found them to be even larger than the physical costs of price adjustment. These 
types of costs can be expected to remain important even in the era of digitalization, 
when the physical costs of price adjustment will probably decrease. Slade (1998), Aguir-
regabiria (1999), and Stella (2014) inferred the magnitude of menu costs from the price 
observations of goods sold in grocery stores using structural econometric estimations 
and found it to be non-negligible. Akerlof and Yellen (1985), Mankiw (1985), and Dixit 
(1991) argued that even small menu costs can result in large business cycles. Consider-
ing their results, the practical relevance of the menu cost assumption seems to be well-
grounded, even if it is compared to alternative explanations of imperfect price adjust-
ment. 
Nowadays, the menu cost assumption usually appears in DSGE models, and 
DSGE-type menu cost models have become the standard tools for analyzing the short-
run real effects of monetary shocks (Golosov and Lucas, 2007; Gertler and Leahy, 2008; 
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2010; Midrigan, 2011; Alvarez et al., 2016; Karádi and Reiff, 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
capital accumulation may be the most important one. According to their estimates, it is followed by the 











2019). However, within their framework, money is neutral in the long run despite the 
nonlinearity of price adjustment caused by the assumption of menu costs. This contra-
dicts the views of some post-Keynesian macroeconomists (Palacio-Vera, 2005; Kriesler 
and Lavoie, 2007). 
All of the cited DSGE-type menu cost models are heterogeneous-agent DSGE 
models with similar structures. The demand side of these models comprises an optimiz-
ing representative household, whose nominal income is assumed to be proportional to 
the nominal money supply; the central bank exogenously determines the latter. The 
supply side of the models consists of a continuum of ex-ante homogenous but ex-post 
heterogeneous firms. This means that firms follow the same dynamically optimal pricing 
decision rule. However, they still make different individual decisions because they are 
hit by idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the realizations of which differ ex-post. The as-
sumed shape of the idiosyncratic shock distribution as well as the assumption of multi-
product firms are crucial for reproducing the shape of the empirical distribution of non-
zero price changes, which, in turn, substantially influences the real effects of monetary 
shocks in menu cost models (Midrigan, 2011; Alvarez et al., 2016). 
Agent-based economic modeling: Agent-based models are becoming increasingly 
popular tools in macroeconomic7 research (Leijonhufvud, 2006; Fagiolo and Roventini, 
2017; Dawid and Delli Gatti, 2018; Dosi and Roventini, 2019; Haldane and Turrell, 
2019), and specifically in monetary macroeconomics (Delli Gatti et al., 2005; Salle et al., 
2013; Dosi et al., 2015; Salle, 2015). An agent-based model is “a model, in which a multi-
tude of (heterogeneous) elements interact with each other and the environment” (Dawid 
and Delli Gatti, 2018, p. 67). Agent-based computational economics (ACE) is the applica-
tion of agent-based modeling to economics or “the computational study of economic pro-
cesses modeled as dynamic systems of interacting agents” (Tesfatsion, 2006, p. 835). 
Standard assumptions of an ACE macro model include a large number of boundedly ra-
tional, heterogeneous agents instead of a perfectly rational, representative one and a 
disequilibrium market mechanism with direct local interactions of agents (Dosi, 2012; 
Fagiolo and Roventini, 2017). Setterfield and Gouri Suresh (2016) argued that agent-
based models are especially useful for studying path-dependent macrodynamics gener-
ated for instance by demand–supply interactions as many path-dependent phenomena 
are emergent. They cannot be observed at the micro-level of the economy, but they 
“emerge” at the macro level as the result of interactions between heterogeneous microe-
conomic agents. Agent-based models have been developed for the analysis of such 
emergent phenomena (Tesfatsion, 2006).8 
Few agent-based models try to assess the differences between DSGE and ACE 
models by building on insights from both modeling traditions (Salle et al., 2013; Salle, 
                                                          
7 The most popular medium-scale agent-based macroeconomic models include the Complex Adaptive 
Trivial Systems (CATS) model (Delli Gatti et al., 2011; Assenza et al., 2015), the EURACE model (Deissen-
berg et al., 2008; Dawid et al., 2019), the Keynes+Schumpeter (K+S) model (Dosi et al., 2010; Dosi et al., 
2017), and the Java Agent-Based MacroEconomic Laboratory (JAMEL) (Seppecher, 2012; Seppecher and 
Salle, 2015). Some important small-scale agent-based macro models can be found, for instance, in Leng-
nick (2013), Gaffeo et al. (2015), and Guerini et al. (2018). 
8 Examples of agent-based models developed for studying a specific form of path-dependency, hysteresis 











2015; Dilaver et al., 2018; Guerini et al., 2018; Gobbi and Grazzini, 2019). The model 
presented in this paper is related to these, but it cannot purely be labeled as an agent-
based model because of its hybrid nature. From a methodological perspective, the model 
developed in this paper most closely relates to the one presented by Babutsidze (2012), 
which is an otherwise standard menu cost model also studied via agent-based simula-
tions. Delli Gatti et al. (2005) presented an example of an agent-based macro model in 
which LRMN fails because the central bank is assumed to influence the economy through 
its supply side by determining the credit costs of financing production. 
New Keynesian models of long-run monetary non-neutrality: In New Keynesian 
models of LRMNN, the long-run real effects of monetary shocks are the results of one of 
the following two types of demand–supply interactions: an insider-outsider mechanism 
of wage bargaining (Galí, 2020) or endogenous technological progress (Jorda et al., 
2020; Garga and Singh, 2021). Their magnitude turns out to be economically significant 
under realistic calibrations. 
3. THE EMPIRICAL DATA 
Before presenting the hybrid menu cost model, it is important to summarize the 
empirical observations that the model is required to reproduce. Its empirical perfor-
mance will be assessed by analyzing how well it fits key moments of two empirical dis-
tributions related to product-level price adjustment: the distribution of nonzero price 
changes and the frequency distribution of price changes. 
These two empirical distributions are derived from a micro-level dataset often 
applied for calibrating menu cost models, the Dominick’s dataset (Midrigan, 2011; Alva-
rez et al., 2016). It consists of scanner price data collected by the James M. Kilts Center 
for Marketing of the University of Chicago, Booth School of Business. The dataset con-
tains nine years (1989–1997) of weekly store-level data regarding the prices of 9,450 
products collected in 86 Dominick’s Finer Foods retail chain stores in the Chicago area. 
As prices are highly correlated across stores, Midrigan (2011) decided to work with 
prices from one store with the largest number of observations. He has made the result-
ing dataset available in the supplemental material to his paper, which is the dataset used 
in this paper. The data were collected during a period of no substantial economic tur-
moil in the U.S. Thus, the calibrated model will estimate the long-run real effects of mon-
etary shocks during normal times. 
The model presented in Section 4 does not contain any incentives for firms to en-
gage in temporary sales; therefore, the data are sales-filtered using the algorithm devel-
oped by Kehoe and Midrigan (2008) to obtain time series about regular prices.9 The re-
sulting weekly time series of regular prices is time-aggregated to monthly frequency by 
only keeping every fourth observation. The monthly frequency of the resulting sample is 
closer to the quarterly frequency of GDP data that will be used to estimate some model 
parameters. This leaves a sample of 100 months of regular prices for 9,450 different 
                                                          
9 The Matlab codes for the sales-filtering algorithm and for calculating the moments of the empirical dis-
tribution of nonzero price changes are available in the Supplemental Material to Midrigan (2011). Appen-











products. As per Midrigan (2011), only price observations for which the calculated regu-
lar price equals the observed price are kept. Finally, all regular price changes are com-
puted as the log difference of subsequent monthly prices. Following Midrigan (2011), all 
regular price changes with a size greater than the 99th percentile of their size distribu-
tion are dropped to eliminate outliers. The final sample consists of 22,630 observations 
of nonzero monthly regular price changes. 
The first step to derive the frequency distribution of empirical price changes is to 
calculate the frequency of monthly regular price changes for each of the 9,450 products. 
This is achieved by dividing the number of months in which the product’s price has 
changed by the number of months for which the price observation and the previous 
month’s observation are not missing. Then, all products with a calculated frequency of 0 
are dropped, as it seems unlikely that the price of a product does not change for nine 
years. Missing values are the most probable reason for not registering any price changes 
for these products. Finally, all products with a frequency of price changes greater than 
the 99th percentile of the frequency distribution are dropped to eliminate outliers.10 The 
final sample consists of the frequencies of regular price changes for 7,765 products. 
 
Note: Both histograms are based on the data available in the supplemental material to Midrigan (2011), 
which have been sales-filtered, time-aggregated to monthly frequency, and cleared of outliers. Superim-
posed are the probability density functions of the normal distribution with equal means and variances. 
Figure 1: The Empirical Distributions of Nonzero Price Changes (left panel) 
and of the Monthly Frequencies of Price Changes (right panel) 
Figure 1 presents the two empirical distributions. The probability density func-
tions of the normal distribution with equal means and variances are superimposed; they 
serve as benchmarks that help make the empirical distributions’ properties visible. 
Graphical inspection of Figure 1, supplemented with calculating key moments of the two 
distributions, reveals some important empirical features of micro-level price adjustment 
that the model should reproduce. While calculating the moments, all price changes and 
                                                          
10 As the number of observations available to calculate the frequencies of price changes is different for 
each product, all frequencies of price changes are weighted with the number of observations available to 






















































all frequencies of price changes related to a certain product are weighted with the share 
of that product in the basket of the average Dominick’s customer.11 
The empirical observations (EO) that the model will be required to reproduce are 
listed below,12 reported together with the values of the moments related to the observa-
tions. All of these moments will be targeted during the calibration of the hybrid menu 
cost model. 
 EO1: The mean size of price changes is large (9.7%). The model needs to repro-
duce this observation for the strength of price adjustment to be realistic within 
its framework. 
 EO2: Still, many price changes are small. Specifically, 28.9% of all price changes 
are smaller than half of the mean size of price changes. This moment will be use-
ful in fine-tuning the correlation between productivity shocks hitting different 
goods supplied by the same firm in the model. 
 EO3: The simultaneous presence of many small price changes and some very 
large price changes implies that the distribution of nonzero price changes exhibits 
substantial excess kurtosis compared to the normal distribution (4.28 versus 
3.00). Alvarez et al. (2016) proved that it is crucial for all menu cost models to 
reproduce the empirical kurtosis of nonzero price changes as it sufficiently sum-
marizes information about the strength of the so-called selection effect, that is, the 
effect that price adjuster firms are not randomly selected, as in the Calvo (1983) 
model of sticky price adjustment, but firms with larger differences between the 
actual and desired prices of their products are more likely to respond to an exog-
enous shock with a price change. The strength of the selection effect plays an im-
portant role in determining the short-run real effects of monetary shocks in menu 
cost models (Caplin and Spulber, 1987; Golosov and Lucas, 2007; Midrigan, 
2011). It seems reasonable to suspect that it also strongly influences the long-run 
real effects once they are brought to life by an appropriate mechanism. 
 EO4: The standard deviation of price changes is large (12.5%). This moment will 
be used to pin down the standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks 
in the model. 
 EO5: The mean nonzero price change is 1.9%. This moment will be useful for gen-
erating a realistic rate of trend inflation in the model. 
 EO6: Price increases are more frequent than price decreases. Specifically, 66.0% of 
all price changes are price increases. 
 EO7: The mean size of price decreases (11.0%) is larger than that of price increases 
(9.0%); the latter is 81.8% of the former. EO6 and EO7 are important to repro-
                                                          
11 The frequencies of price changes are also weighted with the number of observations available to calcu-
late them, as it is different for each product because of the missing values present in the dataset. 
12 These empirical observations can be considered as standard: they have all been reported before in the 
empirical literature of sticky price adjustment (Bils and Klenow, 2004; Klenow and Kryvtsov, 2008; 
Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008). Müller and Ray (2007) and Chen et al. (2008) present detailed empirical 













duce if the asymmetry between the real effects of positive and negative monetary 
shocks is to be analyzed. 
 EO8: Price changes are rare for the average product. The mean monthly frequen-
cy of price changes is 11.6%. This moment is important to be reproduced by the 
model to generate a realistic degree of price stickiness. According to Alvarez et al. 
(2016), it is the other key moment, along with the kurtosis of the distribution of 
nonzero price changes that determines the short-run real effects of monetary 
shocks in menu cost models. Hence, it will probably be important for the long-run 
real effects as well. 
 EO9: The frequency distribution of price changes is skewed to the right. The prices 
of most products change in around 5%–15% of the months, but some products 
have price change frequencies above 30%. The skewness of the distribution is 
equal to 0.62. This information will help the model generate a realistic degree of 
heterogeneity in the frequencies of price changes. 
 4. THE HYBRID MENU COST MODEL 
 This section presents the hybrid menu cost model and its calibration. 
 4.1. General Properties of the Model 
Before going into the details of the model, it is worth summarizing the key prop-
erties that make it a hybrid post-Keynesian-DSGE-agent-based menu cost model. Its 
general structure mimics that of DSGE-type menu cost models, which can answer how 
large short-run real effects emerge at the macro level of the economy because of hetero-
geneous micro-level price adjustment to monetary shocks. Hence, after some appropri-
ate amendments, their structure seems to be a natural starting point for studying the 
connections between heterogeneous micro-level price dynamics and the long-run real 
effects of monetary shocks. 
An economy’s goods market is modeled, the demand side of which comprises a 
perfectly rational representative household.13 The supply side consists of 𝑁 heterogene-
ous, monopolistically competitive firms, each selling 𝐺 different types of goods. All 
product varieties sold in the market are differentiated from each other. The model ex-
hibits all the important characteristics of DSGE-type menu cost models summarized in 
Section 2, except the ex-ante homogeneity and the perfect rationality of firms.14 It con-
tains both economic mechanisms that may lead to the failure of LRMN according to post-
Keynesian monetary macroeconomics: nonlinear price adjustment and demand–supply 
interactions. To the best of the author’s knowledge, these post-Keynesian features make 
                                                          
13 Assuming the existence of a perfectly rational representative household is rather unusual in an econom-
ic model with agent-based features, but it facilitates the comparability of the model structure to that of 
DSGE-type menu cost models. In menu cost models, the important nominal and real adjustments take 
place in the supply side of the market; therefore, the demand side is usually modeled as simply as possi-
ble. 
14 However, a variant of the model with dynamically optimizing firms is presented in Subsection 6.1 to 










this the first menu cost model suitable for studying the long-run real effects of monetary 
shocks besides their short-run ones. 
The model's behavior is studied via agent-based simulations. Still, it cannot pure-
ly be labeled as an agent-based model because it lacks one of the core ingredients of ACE 
models: the direct local interactions between agents. Firms interact globally in the model 
by affecting the dynamics of market aggregates, which feed back into micro-level pricing 
decisions.15 This simplification serves comparability with DSGE-type models and can be 
relaxed in future research steps. 
Still, the model shares several common features with agent-based economic 
models. The most important is that it contains a multitude of heterogeneous, boundedly 
rational firms, the interactions of which are analyzed via agent-based simulations. Each 
firm’s pricing decision is explicitly simulated, and they are aggregated numerically to 
assess how large long-run real effect unfolds after a monetary shock as a macro-level 
emergent phenomenon resulting from the global interactions between these heteroge-
neous micro-level pricing decisions. 
The assumption of bounded rationality is in line with the views of Simon (1955, 
1956), with the perspective of post-Keynesian economics (Lavoie, 2014) and with the 
spirit of ACE (Tesfatsion, 2006; Dosi, 2012; Fagiolo and Roventini, 2017). Firms are as-
sumed to not have perfect knowledge about their market environment because of their 
decision makers’ cognitive limitations. Additionally, the complexity of the environment 
makes it impossible to gather all the relevant information necessary for making optimal 
choices. This paper regards boundedly rational decision-making the same way as Simon 
(1955, 1956). Because of the firms’ inability to make optimal decisions, they use heuris-
tics, that is, simple rules of thumb, for making decisions. Heuristics allow firms to easily 
arrive at decisions being in line with their profit-maximizing motivations by simplifying 
the decision problem (Gigerenzer, 2008; Hommes, 2013). In this sense, the choices made 
are satisfying but not optimal.16, 17 
There are two motivations behind the assumption of bounded rationality in the 
model. First, according to the experimental evidence of behavioral economics (Tversky 
and Kahneman, 1974; Camerer et al., 2004), it describes how economic decisions are 
made in reality better than the perfectly rational pricing behavior assumed in DSGE-type 
menu cost models. Second, it substantially reduces the mathematical and computational 
burden of analyzing the model by eliminating the need to numerically solve complicated 
dynamic optimization problems in a heterogeneous-agent DSGE framework. Despite the 
simpler mathematical structure of the model, its empirical performance will be shown to 
be just as good as that of DSGE-type menu cost models in Subsection 4.6.18 
                                                          
15 See Brock and Durlauf (2001) for a distinction between local and global interactions. 
16 In a post-Keynesian approach, bounded rationality can be grounded with the assumption that firms face 
fundamental uncertainty (Keynes, 1921; Knight, 1921) because of the limited human abili-
ties/characteristics (O’Donnell, 2013) of their decision makers. 
17 I do not want to suggest that firms are less rational in reality than households. The assumption of per-
fect rationality in the case of the representative household serves convenience only. It does not play a key 
role in determining the model’s conclusions, while facilitating comparison with DSGE-type menu cost 
models. 
18 In addition, the model will be able to reproduce the shape of the frequency distribution of empirical 











The reduced computational burden opens the way for another ACE feature to be 
included in the hybrid menu cost model, making it possible to assume that firms are ex-
ante heterogeneous, not just ex-post, as in most DSGE-type menu cost models. Firms are 
assumed to be permanently different concerning their price adjustment thresholds. This 
allows the model to reproduce the shape of the frequency distribution of price changes. 
DSGE-type menu cost models usually match only the mean.19 The modeled goods market 
carries some sort of disequilibrium characteristics, which also exhibit similarities with 
ACE models. Firms cannot perfectly coordinate demand with the supply of their prod-
ucts because of their bounded rationality; hence, the submarkets of individual product 
varieties will always be in short-run disequilibrium even in the absence of price rigidity, 
inducing further price adjustments in the future. 
 4.2. The Demand Side of the Market 
 The demand side of the market is assumed to consist of a perfectly rational rep-
resentative household that behaves according to the Dixit-Stiglitz model of monopolistic 
competition (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). The household decides the demanded quantities 





























where 𝑐 stands for the consumed quantities, and 𝑝 represents the prices. The 𝑖 subscript 
refers to the firms, the 𝑔 subscript denotes the different product varieties supplied by 
the same firm, and the 𝑡 subscript stands for the time periods, which will be taken to a 
month during the calibration. 𝐶 denotes the household’s utility, which will be used to 
measure aggregate consumption in the model. The utility function is assumed to be of a 
CES type (CES–Constant Elasticity of Substitution), where > 1 is the absolute value of 
the across-firm elasticity of substitution. The first constraint of the problem expresses 
𝑐𝑖,𝑡 as a CES aggregate of consumed quantities of the goods supplied by firm 𝑖, where 𝛾 >
1 is the absolute value of the across-good elasticity of substitution. The second con-
straint of the problem is the household’s budget constraint, where 𝑌 denotes nominal 
                                                          
19 An exception is the multisector DSGE-type menu cost model of Nakamura and Steinsson (2010), in 
which different sectors of the economy are ex-ante heterogeneous as they face different amounts of menu 
costs. However, the number of sectors is limited to 14 as the computational burden of solving 14 dynamic 
profit-maximization problems simultaneously in a heterogeneous-agent DSGE framework is already 
heavy. There are no such limitations in an agent-based framework as the bounded rationality of the deci-












aggregate demand or, equivalently, the nominal income of the representative house-
hold.20 The budget constraint expresses that total spending on different product varie-
ties has to be equal to the household’s nominal income. 
By solving the household’s utility-maximization problem, its demand functions 
for the 𝑁 × 𝐺 product varieties can be derived. The household’s demand function for 
variety 𝑔 supplied by firm 𝑖 is 





















1−𝛾. These definitions of the price indices 
imply that nominal aggregate expenditure will be equal to 𝑃𝑡𝐶𝑡 . The demanded quantity 
of a product variety decreases ceteris paribus if it becomes more expensive than other 
varieties supplied by the same firm, and the household wants to buy less from a particu-
lar firm if its price index increases relative to the market price level.21 Finally, a rise in 
the household’s real income increases the demanded quantities of all product varieties, 
assuming that their relative prices remain unchanged. 
The household’s nominal income is determined by monetary policy: the central 
bank is assumed to control nominal aggregate demand according to an exogenous sto-
chastic process.22, 23 Let 𝑔𝑡
𝑌 denote the gross growth rate of nominal aggregate demand 
in period 𝑡, that is, 𝑔𝑡
𝑌 = 𝑌𝑡/𝑌𝑡−1. The growth rate of nominal aggregate demand is as-
sumed to follow a first-order autoregressive (AR(1)) process:24 
 log 𝑔𝑡
𝑌 = (1 − 𝜑) log ?̅?𝑌 + 𝜑 log 𝑔𝑡−1
𝑌 + 𝜉𝑡, (2) 
where ?̅?𝑌 is the gross trend growth rate of nominal aggregate demand, and 𝜑 ∈ [0, 1) 
determines the persistence of nominal demand growth. Finally, 𝜉𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜉
2) is an inde-
                                                          
20 𝑌𝑡  could also be labeled as the nominal money supply if the income velocity of money was assumed to be 
equal to 1. Considering that a period in the model corresponds to a month, such an assumption would not 
be unrealistic at all. Following Nakamura and Steinsson (2010), the term nominal aggregate demand is 
used for 𝑌𝑡 . 
21 This results in global interactions (Brock and Durlauf, 2001) between firms’ price-setting behavior simi-
lar to those present in the coordination failure model described by Cooper and John (1988). If demand 
depends on the price level, then the pricing decisions of individual firms will indirectly influence each 
other. In the spirit of ACE, the macro price level as an emergent phenomenon will feed back into micro-
level pricing decisions (Tesfatsion, 2006). 
22 The exact channels of monetary transmission are not crucial to be modeled for the purpose of the re-
search. It is of secondary importance if the central bank controls the interest rate or the money supply; the 
only important assumption is that the central bank is able to induce changes in nominal aggregate de-
mand. The focus will be on the real effects of these changes. 
23 This assumption is a shortcut for the usual practice followed in DSGE-type menu cost models, according 
to which the form of the utility function is chosen in a way that assures nominal income will be propor-
tional to nominal money supply in the case of optimal behavior. See Golosov and Lucas (2007) for the 
necessary restrictions on the utility function. 
24 The same AR (1) process is assumed for nominal money growth in the DSGE-type menu cost models of 
Midrigan (2011) and Karádi and Reiff (2019). In the case of the former, the constant term is missing since 











pendent, identically normally distributed random variable with mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝜉
2. 
𝜉𝑡 represents the monetary shock in period 𝑡. 
 4.3. The Supply Side of the Market 
 The paper now departs from the assumptions of the Dixit-Stiglitz model and be-
gins implementing the model’s post-Keynesian and agent-based features. The supply 
side of the market is populated by 𝑁 heterogeneous, monopolistically competitive firms, 
which are the agents in the model. 
Each firm is assumed to have a supply potential ?̅?𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 for all supplied product vari-
eties, which are allowed to change over time. The supply potential of a product is the 
amount of its output that its producer strives to sell. Boundedly rational firms are as-
sumed not to know demand functions (1) and AR(1) process (2) of nominal demand 
growth, but they are assumed to know their own cost structures. In such a situation of 
imperfect information, the supply potential of a product variety cannot be anything else 
but the amount of output, at which it is the most cost-efficient to be produced. In a post-
Keynesian perspective, the supply potential can also be interpreted as the output corre-
sponding to the normal capacity utilization rate. In the model, macro-level potential 
output is the aggregate of micro-level supply potentials.25 
Firms decide their prices simultaneously using a heuristic rule.26 The rule follows 
their motivation to produce close to the supply potentials of their products as it helps 
coordinate demand with them. The presence of menu costs implies that it is not worth 
changing the prices if demanded quantities are anticipated to be close to the supply po-
tentials, as the loss implied by the menu cost would probably offset the potential gains of 
price adjustment. In line with DSGE-type menu cost models with multiproduct firms, 
firms are assumed to enjoy economies of scope in price adjustment; if they pay the menu 
cost, they can reprice all their products, even those that are only slightly mispriced.27 
This assumption helps generate a realistic amount of small price changes in the model 
(Midrigan, 2011; Alvarez et al., 2016; Karádi and Reiff, 2019). 
In line with DSGE-type menu cost models, production is assumed to be demand-
determined; thus, produced quantities 𝑞𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 are equal to demanded quantities: 𝑞𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 =
𝑐𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 for ∀𝑖, 𝑔, 𝑡.28 This implies that there are no inventories or shortages of any product 
variety, which can be interpreted as assuming that the goods supplied in the market are 
perishable.29 
                                                          
25 The term supply potential is borrowed from Arestis and Sawyer (2009). 
26 According to survey data from the U.K., 65% of the surveyed firms primarily set their prices using rules 
of thumb or based on past or current information. Only 35% of the surveyed firms claim that they set their 
prices in a forward-looking way (Greenslade and Parker, 2012). 
27 Lach and Tsiddon (2007), Midrigan (2011), and Stella (2014) present empirical evidence for economies 
of scope in price setting. The latter two studies are based on the Dominick’s dataset. 
28 This assumption, together with assuming the existence of a representative household, allows one to set 
aside the explicit modeling of direct local interactions between firms and households, thereby facilitating 
comparison with DSGE-type menu cost models. 
29 Allowing for the presence of inventories would be an interesting way of extending the model. It would 
potentially make the real effects of monetary shocks dependent on the existing stock of inventories. For 












Before making pricing decisions, firms create expectations about excess demand 
?̂?𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 for each of their supplied products. This is achieved by computing the relative devi-







where 𝑥𝑒 denotes the firm’s expectation for the value of any variable 𝑥. 
Pricing decisions are governed by the anticipated value of an index that measures 
the average extent of disequilibrium in the submarkets of the product varieties supplied 
by firm 𝑖. The anticipated value of the disequilibrium index of firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡 is denoted 
by ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝑒  and is calculated as 
?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 = √
∑ {[1 − ∙ 𝐼(?̂?𝑖,𝑔,𝑡






where ∈ [0, 1] measures the asymmetry of price adjustment, and 𝐼( ) is the indicator 
function that returns 1 if anticipated excess demand for good 𝑔 is negative and returns 0 
otherwise. It is assumed that > 0; thus, when firms create expectations about the val-
ue of the firm-level disequilibrium index, they assign lower weights to products for 
which they expect excess supply. The reason for this is that although firms do not know 
the specific form of AR(1) process (2) governing nominal aggregate demand, they are 
assumed to be able to observe the inflation rate; hence, they are aware that there is 
trend inflation in the economy (?̅?𝑌 > 1). In the presence of trend inflation, the relative 
price of a product falls, even if its nominal price is unchanged. Under such circumstanc-
es, the anticipated excess supply required by a firm to decrease the price of a product is 
larger than the anticipated excess demand required to increase it. This way, the firm can 
save on the menu cost by letting trend inflation move the relative prices of its products 
with anticipated excess supply in the desired direction.30 
The presence of menu costs leads to the appearance of an inaction band around 
zero anticipated firm-level disequilibrium, within which firms keep their prices un-
changed. Let 𝑧𝑖 denote the price adjustment threshold of firm 𝑖, that is, the anticipated 
value of the disequilibrium index, above which the firm changes the prices of its prod-
ucts. This threshold value is assumed to be ex-ante heterogeneous across firms. A possi-
ble explanation is that firms differ in the amounts of menu costs they face. The value of 
𝑧𝑖 is not determined by menu costs alone; it may also depend on the time preferences of 
the firm’s decision makers or their perceptions about the uncertainty of the market en-
vironment. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to assume that the threshold depends positive-
ly on the amount to be paid for menu costs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the additional demand generated by a positive monetary shock weaker than the increase necessary when 
inventories are low. 
30 Assuming a perfectly rational single-product firm, Ball and Mankiw (1994) showed that the gap re-
quired between the actual and the desired price to induce price adjustment is larger in cases of price de-
creases than increases, if there is an inflation trend in the economy. Their idea is generalized to a multi-
product setting. The other important difference is that this paper does not assume that the asymmetry of 
price adjustment measured by  is optimally chosen. Its value will be calibrated to match the empirical 

































𝑒 > 𝑧𝑖  and ?̂?𝑖,𝑔,𝑡
𝑒 < 0
𝑝𝑖,𝑔,𝑡−1,                                                if ?̂?𝑖,𝑡
𝑒 ≤ 𝑧𝑖
, (3) 
where 𝛼𝑈 ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter determining the strength of upward price adjustment, 
and 𝛼𝐷 ∈ [0, 1] is another parameter determining the strength of downward price ad-
justment. According to pricing decision rule (3), firm 𝑖 keeps its prices unchanged if the 
anticipated value of its disequilibrium index does not exceed its price adjustment 
threshold. Otherwise, it will adjust its prices based on anticipated excess demand. If firm 
𝑖 expects demand for its good 𝑔 to be greater than its supply potential, it will raise its 
price to decrease demanded quantity. In the opposite case, the firm will lower the price 
to increase the demanded quantity. The sizes of price changes are regulated by parame-
ters 𝛼𝑈 and 𝛼𝐷 .31 As price decreases are larger than price increases empirically, accord-
ing to EO7 reported in Section 3, it is expected that the value of 𝛼𝑈 will turn out to be 
smaller than 𝛼𝐷 during the calibration. According to U.K. survey data collected by 
Greenslade and Parker (2012), such a result could be explained by firms’ fear that their 
consumers will not tolerate large price increases. Large price decreases are better justi-
fied, as they may help steal consumers from competitors. Finally, note that pricing deci-
sion rule (3) is general enough to be consistent with the New Keynesian interpretation 
of nonlinear price adjustment (menu costs) and also with its post-Keynesian interpreta-
tions mentioned in Section 2, that is, fundamental uncertainty and the lack of decreasing 
returns near the supply potential. 
 The individual price adjustment thresholds are drawn from a lognormal distribu-
tion. It is an asymmetric probability distribution; hence, it allows the model to repro-
duce EO9, according to which, the frequency distribution of price changes is skewed to 
the right. Specifically, it is assumed that 
log 𝑧𝑖 ~𝑁(log (
𝑧̅2
√𝑧̅2 + 𝜎𝑧2





where 𝑧̅ > 0 and 𝜎𝑧 > 0 are parameters. The above parameterization of the normal dis-
tribution assures that the mean price adjustment threshold will exactly be equal to 𝑧̅, 
and the standard deviation of price adjustment thresholds will equal 𝜎𝑧. 
                                                          
31 The assumed pricing decision rule conditional on adjustment is inspired by Kornai and Martos (1973), 
who assume that firms decide about production based on excess demand, which is proxied by the differ-
ence between the actual and the desired amount of their inventories. Duménil and Lévy (1991) assume 
the same decision rule for prices. In post-Keynesian and agent-based models, it is also standard to assume 
that prices or markups react to excess demand either directly (Solow and Stiglitz, 1968; Leijonhufvud, 
2006; Guerini et al., 2018; Nishi and Stockhammer, 2020) or indirectly through the deviation of the actual 











 Firms are assumed to use a very simple adaptive rule to form their expectations 
about demand. They expect that demanded quantities in the current period will be equal 
to the quantities demanded in the previous period, as follows:32 
𝑞𝑖,𝑔,𝑡
𝑒 = 𝑞𝑖,𝑔,𝑡−1. 
 Two stochastic processes determine the evolution of supply potentials. It is as-
sumed that the supply potential of good 𝑔 produced by firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡 can be decom-
posed into two components as 
?̅?𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 = 𝜇𝑡 ∙ 𝛿𝑖,𝑔,𝑡, 
where 𝜇𝑡 is the aggregate component of the supply potential, which is common to all 
product varieties supplied in the market, and 𝛿𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 is the goods-specific component of 
the supply potential, independent across firms but correlated across goods produced by 
the same firm and in time. 
 Let 𝑔𝑡
𝜇
= 𝜇𝑡 𝜇𝑡−1⁄  denote the gross growth rate of the aggregate component. Its 
evolution is assumed to be determined by the following equation: 
 log 𝑔𝑡
𝜇
= log ?̅?𝜇 + (log𝑄𝑡−1 − log ?̅?𝑡−1) + 𝜈𝑡, (4) 








 is real aggregate output computed as the CES aggregate of the amounts of 






 is macro-level potential output cal-
culated as the CES aggregate of the amounts of firm-level potential output. Firm-level 






 is the CES aggregate of the quantities of product 







the CES aggregate of the supply potentials of products supplied by the firm. ∈ [0, 1] is a 
parameter determining the strength of demand–supply interactions and, finally, 
𝜈𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜈
2) is an independent, identically normally distributed random variable with 
mean 0 and variance 𝜎𝜈
2. It represents the aggregate productivity shock in the model. 
 Equation (4) can be interpreted as follows. If the actual output of the economy 
equals its potential output and an aggregate productivity shock does not hit it, then the 
aggregate component of supply potentials grows at the rate of ?̅?𝜇 − 1. If the output gap 
is positive (𝑄𝑡 > ?̅?𝑡), the potential growth rate rises above its steady-state value. If the 
output gap is negative (𝑄𝑡 < ?̅?𝑡), the potential growth rate falls below its steady-state 
value. The strength of this interaction between demand-determined actual output and 
                                                          
32 Gigerenzer and Brighton (2009) argued that the simplest heuristics are more successful in fundamental-
ly uncertain environments than more sophisticated ones. Dosi et al. (2020) examined this idea within an 
agent-based macroeconomic model and found that the simple adaptive rule that this paper assumes for 











potential output (aggregate supply) is regulated by parameter . The possible economic 
mechanisms behind demand–supply interactions are detailed in Section 2. Of course, the 
arrival of an aggregate productivity shock may overwrite the effects of the first two 
terms of Equation (4) on potential growth. 
Demand–supply interactions are modeled with a macro-level equation that lacks 
explicit microeconomic foundations. Although this is a considerable simplification, it 
seems to be acceptable for two reasons. On the one hand, it seems reasonable to assume 
that a recessionary (booming) macroeconomic environment worsens (improves) the 
growth prospects of all firms, not just of those forced to produce below (above) the sup-
ply potentials of their products. As mentioned in Section 2, long-term unemployment 
increases (decreases) during recessions (booms), the quality and quantity of the active 
labor force deteriorate (develop), which is an aggregate effect, reducing (improving) the 
opportunities of all firms to hire workers with sufficiently strong skills. Aggregate 
productivity growth slows (accelerates) during recessions (booms), making it more dif-
ficult (easier) for all firms to benefit from knowledge spillovers, etc.33 On the other hand, 
the post-Keynesian literature provides many examples for this method of modeling de-
mand–supply interactions (Lavoie, 2006; Fontana and Palacio-Vera, 2007; Kriesler and 
Lavoie, 2007; Setterfield, 2009; Nishi and Stockhammer, 2020). DeLong and Summers 
(2012) also use an equation similar to Equation (4), while Jorda et al. (2020) model en-
dogenous TFP growth similarly in a DSGE framework. 
This modeling practice has advantages and disadvantages. One advantage is that 
it allows the researcher to draw more general conclusions. If one focuses on a specific 
microfounded mechanism that results in demand–supply interactions, one cannot de-
termine whether the model outcomes hold for other mechanisms. This is a problem be-
cause it is still rather unexplored, which of the theoretically possible channels of de-
mand–supply interactions are the most important in reality. Equation (4) is general 
enough to make it possible to clarify whether any microeconomic mechanism that re-
sults in significant demand–supply interactions leads to the failure of LRMN or not. An-
other advantage is that it allows one to develop a simple estimate for the strength of 
demand–supply interactions using macroeconomic data instead of micro-level observa-
tions. The disadvantage is that it does not allow to explain what determines the strength 
of demand–supply interactions; hence, the possible long-run real effects of monetary 
shocks that may unfold as their consequences. In this way, the model has limited ability 
to develop policy advice about influencing the long-run effectiveness of monetary policy. 
Therefore, an important direction of future research might be to develop detailed micro-
foundations for demand–supply interactions.34 However, this paper will first examine if 
they matter at all. 
                                                          
33 Equation (4) represents another manifestation of global interactions (Brock and Durlauf, 2001) be-
tween firms, which take the form of positive spillover effects similar to those described in the literature of 
coordination failures (Cooper and John, 1988): if the majority of firms produce below their supply poten-
tials, it will affect the supply potentials of all firms negatively. In the spirit of ACE (Tesfatsion, 2006), mac-
ro-level potential output as an emergent phenomenon will feed back into micro-level pricing decisions. 
34 Dosi et al. (2010, 2018) came up with boundedly rational, disequilibrium microfoundations for de-
mand–supply interactions in an agent-based macro model, while Anzoategui et al. (2019) and Garga and 











 The evolution of the goods-specific component of the supply potential is deter-
mined by the following AR (1) process: 
log 𝛿𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 = 𝜌 log 𝛿𝑖,𝑔,𝑡−1 + 𝑖,𝑔,𝑡, 
where 𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 is a random variable representing an idiosyncratic productivity shock hitting 
the supply potential of good 𝑔 supplied by firm 𝑖 in period 𝑡, and 𝜌 ∈ [0, 1) is a parame-
ter determining the persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks. 
 An appropriate assumption about the distribution of idiosyncratic productivity 
shocks allows the model to reproduce the shape of the empirical distribution of nonzero 
price changes, crucially influencing the real effects of monetary shocks. Following Ger-
tler and Leahy (2008) and Midrigan (2011), this paper assumes that the distribution of 
idiosyncratic productivity shocks is leptokurtic. This way, the model will reproduce the 
substantial excess kurtosis of the empirical distribution of nonzero price changes. Spe-
cifically, idiosyncratic productivity shocks are assumed to arrive infrequently, according 
to a Poisson process: 
?̃?,𝑔,𝑡 = {







)  with probability 𝜆
, 
where 𝜆 ∈ [0, 1] is the probability that a nonzero shock arrives35, and 𝜒 > 0 is a parame-
ter to be introduced, which influences the correlation between productivity shocks hit-
ting the supply potentials of goods produced by the same firm. Conditional on arrival, 
the shocks are drawn from a normal distribution, with mean 0 and variance 
𝜎𝜁
2 {[1 + 𝜒(2 + 𝜒) 𝐺⁄ ]𝜆}⁄ .36 It is proven, in Online Appendix A, that this parameterization 
of the normal distribution assures that the variance of idiosyncratic productivity shocks 
𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 will exactly be equal to 𝜎𝜁
2. 
Goods-specific productivity shocks are assumed to be uncorrelated across firms, 
but they are correlated across goods produced by the same firm. Within-firm correlation 
between goods-specific productivity shocks is modeled following Midrigan (2011). The 
actual realizations of goods-specific productivity shocks are determined as 
 𝑖,𝑔,𝑡 = ?̃?,𝑔,𝑡 + 𝜒mean𝑔( ?̃?,𝑔,𝑡). (5) 
 In Online Appendix B, it is proven that to set the within-firm correlation of goods-
specific productivity shocks to 𝜌𝜁 ∈ [−1, 1)37, 𝜒 must be determined as 
                                                          
35 A smaller value of 𝜆 increases the kurtosis of the idiosyncratic shock distribution and, thereby, that of 
the distribution of nonzero price changes as well. 
36 It would seem realistic to assume that positive productivity shocks are likelier to arrive than negative 
ones; their distribution is still assumed to be symmetric around zero. This assumption serves convenience 
only; it facilitates comparison with DSGE-type menu cost models but can be relaxed in the future. Note 
that supply potentials are still likelier to increase in the model than to decrease because their aggregate 
component is assumed to exhibit trend growth. 
37 The within-firm correlation of goods-specific productivity shocks is restricted from being equal to 1 as 













− 1. (6) 
 In this way, the value of 𝜌𝜁  can be set as a parameter, and the value of 𝜒 is deter-
mined automatically according to Equation (6). A smaller correlation between goods-
specific productivity shocks increases the fraction of small price changes in the model as 
the probability of large shocks hitting some goods, accompanied by small shocks hitting 
other goods, is higher. Under such realizations of goods-specific productivity shocks, 
price adjustment is induced by the large shocks, and small price changes are carried out 
for the goods hit by small shocks that have only been slightly mispriced. 
 4.4. Simulations 
The model’s nonlinearities and the different forms of heterogeneity do not allow 
for an analytical solution; hence, its behavior is studied via agent-based simulations. 
Simulations begin from situations where aggregate or idiosyncratic shocks do not hit the 
market, the actual quantities produced are equal to the supply potentials, and all varia-
bles are constant in time. The initial values of supply potentials are set to ?̅?𝑖,𝑔,0 = 1 for 
∀𝑖, 𝑔, and the initial value of nominal aggregate demand to 𝑌0 = 𝑁 × 𝐺. This implies that 
nominal demand per product variety will be equal to 1, and prices also initially need to 
equal to 1. 
The timeline of events within each period is as follows: 
1. Nominal aggregate demand is determined after the central bank comes up with a 
realization for the monetary shock. 
2. Firms discover the supply potentials of their products following the realizations 
of aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity shocks. 
3. Firms decide about prices simultaneously. 
4. The price level is calculated. 
5. The household decides about demanded quantities. Production is demand-
determined; the demand decision also determines the output of each product. 
6. Aggregate statistics are computed. The most important statistics calculated at the 
end of each period are the real aggregate output and the inflation rate. For the 
sake of easier interpretation, the latter is measured by the year-on-year growth 
rate of the price level. 
The simulation is run for 1000 periods, sufficient for a steady-state joint distribu-
tion of relative prices and growth rates of supply potentials to emerge.38 Then, the simu-
lation is run for another 𝑇 periods, and the first 1000 periods are discarded. This assures 
that the statistics from the simulated time series will not be biased by the initial adjust-
ment toward a steady state. 
In the case of simulating impulse response functions to monetary shocks, a simi-
lar procedure is followed. First, a 1000 + 𝑇 period long baseline path is simulated for the 
variables without monetary shocks, but with aggregate and idiosyncratic productivity 
                                                          












shocks present. Then, another path is simulated using the same random numbers but 
with a monetary shock of a given size arriving in period 1002. The percentage deviations 
are calculated between the two simulated paths of the variables, the first 1000 periods 
are discarded, and period 1001 is treated as period 0. This exercise is repeated 10,000 
times, and the 10,000 time series for each variable is averaged out. The resulting time 
series approximate the conditional expectations for the deviations between the values of 
the variables on the baseline paths and on the paths hit by a monetary shock, where 
there are two conditions: 
1. The variables are forecasted from period 0, when the market is in a steady state. 
2. The central bank creates a monetary shock in period 1 and sets 𝜉𝑡 = 0 for ∀𝑡 > 1. 
The resulting conditional forecasts are the impulse response functions of the var-
iables of interest.39 This way, it will be possible to assess whether a particular perma-
nent shock to the level of nominal aggregate demand, interacting with the two different 
types of productivity shocks expected to arrive while the monetary shock dies away, is 
expected to have a permanent effect on the level of real aggregate output. If a permanent 
effect is anticipated, then LRMN fails in the model. 
 4.5. Estimating the Strength of Demand–Supply Interactions 
A key parameter determining the long-run real effects of monetary shocks in the 
model is , the strength of demand–supply interactions. This subsection is therefore de-
voted to establishing a simple empirical estimate for its value. 
To estimate the parameters of Equation (4), it seems necessary to have empirical 
estimates about the aggregate component of supply potentials. However, as shown in 
Online Appendix C, it is sufficient to have estimates about macro-level potential output if 
the law of large numbers can be assumed to hold for idiosyncratic productivity shocks, 
that is, if they cancel out in the aggregates.40 Under this assumption, the potential 
growth rate always equals the growth rate of the aggregate component of supply poten-
tials and, hence, log 𝑔𝑡
𝜇
 can be substituted with ∆ log ?̅?𝑡, the growth rate of potential out-
put, when estimating Equation (4). 
Quarterly data about real GDP and quarterly estimates of the potential GDP in the 
U.S. are used to estimate Equation (4). Both variables are measured in billions of 2012 
dollars, the time series of real GDP is seasonally adjusted, and its source is the U.S. Bu-
reau of Economic Analysis. Estimates from the U.S. Congressional Budget Office are used 
to measure potential output.41 As the two empirical distributions characterizing micro-
level price adjustment are based on a dataset aggregated to monthly frequency, a period 
in the model should correspond to a month; hence,  should also be estimated using 
monthly data. Unfortunately, the highest frequency at which GDP data are available is 
quarterly. Therefore, quadratic spline interpolation is used to approximate the possible 
                                                          
39 Koop et al. (1996) explained why this is the appropriate way of simulating impulse response functions 
in nonlinear multivariate models. 
40 This assumption is always made in DSGE-type menu cost models, but it is not a trivial assumption at all. 
See Jovanovic (1987), Durlauf (1993), Gabaix (2011), or Acemoglu et al. (2012) for possible explanations 
as to why the law of large numbers may not hold for idiosyncratic shocks in reality. 










monthly time series of real GDP and potential GDP. The estimates of  are based on this 
interpolated sample covering all the months between January 1989 and December 1997 
(108 observations altogether), which is the same period during which the Dominick’s 
dataset was collected. A larger sample is used as a robustness check, containing interpo-
lated monthly data from January 1949 to December 2018 (840 observations altogether). 
The right-hand side variable in Equation (4), the output gap is calculated as the log dif-
ference between actual and potential GDP, and is denoted as ?̂?𝑡. 
Table 1 contains the results of some augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) tests for the 
presence of a unit root in the time series of the potential growth rate and the output gap. 
The test equations include an intercept and a deterministic time trend. The optimal lag 
length is selected according to the Schwarz information criterion. Surprisingly, the null 
hypotheses that the time series of the potential growth rate and output gap contain unit 
roots cannot be rejected based on the 1989–1997 sample. However, they can be rejected 
at the 5% significance level based on the full (1949–2018) sample, suggesting that the 
two variables are stationary; however, the period between 1989 and 1997 is probably 
too short to reveal their stationarity. Hence, Equation (4) can probably be estimated us-
ing the 1989–1997 sample, but it will also be estimated using the 1949–2018 sample as 
a robustness check. 
 
Variable ∆ log ?̅?𝑡 ?̂?𝑡 ∆ log ?̅?𝑡 ?̂?𝑡 










Sample 1989–1997 1989–1997 1949–2018 1949–2018 
Frequency Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly 
Number of observations 103 103 826 820 
Note: The test equations include an intercept and a deterministic time trend. The optimal lag length is 
selected according to the Schwarz information criterion. * - significance at 𝑝 < 0.10, ** - significance at 𝑝 <
0.05, *** - significance at 𝑝 < 0.01. 
Table 1: The Results of Augmented Dickey–Fuller Tests 
Performed on the Growth Rate of U.S. Potential GDP and the Output Gap 
Table 2 contains the results of estimating Equation (4) based on three different 
samples. A constant term is included in the equation in all cases, but its value is not re-
ported, as ?̅?𝜇 will be calibrated later to match the empirical value of the mean nonzero 
price change, allowing the model to generate a realistic rate of trend inflation.42 The es-
timations have been performed with ordinary least squares (OLS). The estimate for  
seems to be quite robust; it is around 0.02 in both the 1989–1997 sample and the 1949–
2018 sample. It is significantly different from zero at all reasonable levels of significance. 
This estimate means that a 1% output gap is expected to increase the potential growth 
rate by 0.02 percentage points next month, which refers to the presence of reasonably 
weak but still statistically significant demand–supply interactions in the U.S. economy. 
                                                          
42 A lower steady-state potential growth rate accelerates trend inflation for a given steady-state growth 



















𝜎𝜈 0.0002 0.0007 0.0006 
Constant Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 1989–1997 1949–2018 1989–1997 
Frequency Monthly Monthly Quarterly 
𝑅2 0.68 0.26 0.68 
Number of observations 107 839 35 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * - significance at 𝑝 < 0.10, ** - significance at 𝑝 < 0.05, *** - sig-
nificance at 𝑝 < 0.01. 
Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Strength of Demand–Supply Interactions 
and of the Standard Deviation of Aggregate Productivity Shocks 
A natural argument against the measured significance of demand–supply interac-
tions is that it might be artificially introduced into the sample by interpolating monthly 
time series from quarterly ones. To assess the validity of this counterargument, Equa-
tion (4) is re-estimated using the original quarterly sample, which does not contain in-
terpolated observations.  remains significantly different from zero at all reasonable 
significance levels. 
The estimated 0.02 value of parameter  is in accordance with its few existing es-
timates. DeLong and Summers (2012) came up with several rough estimates for the val-
ue of , which must be around 0.24 according to their conclusion based on annual data. 
The estimate of ≈ 0.02 is based on monthly data; thus, it corresponds to an annual 
estimate of ≈ 12 × 0.02 = 0.24 roughly, which is the same value as the one estimated 
by DeLong and Summers (2012). Jorda et al. (2020) also estimated an equation similar 
to Equation (4) with the growth rate of TFP as the left-hand-side variable. Using annual 
data, they concluded that the 95% confidence interval of  is [0.21, 0.30]. The estimates 
presented in Table 2 fall into this range once they are transformed to annual frequency. 
The estimate for the standard deviation of aggregate productivity shocks seems 
to be robust, as well. 𝜎𝜈 is not greater than 0.0007 during any of the estimations. Based 
on the monthly 1989–1997 sample, the standard deviation of aggregate productivity 
shocks is estimated to be 0.02%.43 
4.6. Calibration 
Based on the results of Subsection 4.5, the value of  is set to 0.02 in the model, 
while the value of 𝜎𝜈 will be 0.0002. Some further parameters have values assigned be-
fore carrying out the calibration exercise. The length of the simulations (𝑇) and the 
number of firms (𝑁) are chosen to be as large as tolerable from the perspective of the 
computational burden. Specifically, 𝑇 is set to 10,000, and the number of different prod-
uct varieties 𝑁 × 𝐺 is set to 1000. It is assumed that 𝐺 = 2, which is the same as the val-
                                                          
43 However, this value may be underestimated because of the use of interpolated time series that are less 











ue used by Midrigan (2011) and Karádi and Reiff (2019). Two different goods per firm 
are sufficient for the model to generate a realistic amount of small price changes. If 𝐺 =
2, then 𝑁 = 500 to keep the number of product varieties at the value of 1000. 
Following Midrigan (2011), the value of the across-firm elasticity of substitution 
 is set to 3, and the value of the across-good elasticity of substitution 𝛾 is set to 1.1. The 
former value is based on empirical estimates of the elasticity of substitution in grocery 
stores similar to Dominick’s; the latter value is motivated by the idea that goods sold by 
the same firm are expected to be less substitutable than goods sold by competitors. 
The nominal GDP measures nominal aggregate demand, and its monthly time se-
ries is approximated from the quarterly series using quadratic spline interpolation. The 
data are sourced from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis,44 and are seasonally adjust-
ed. The value of the steady-state gross growth rate of nominal aggregate demand ?̅?𝑌 is 
set to 1.0046, the average gross monthly growth rate of nominal GDP in the U.S. between 
1989 and 1997. The two other parameters of stochastic process (2) governing nominal 
aggregate demand are estimated by fitting an AR (1) process on the monthly growth rate 
of the U.S. nominal GDP. The persistence of nominal demand growth 𝜑 is estimated to be 
0.61, and the standard deviation of monetary shocks 𝜎𝜉 is estimated at 0.0015. These are 
almost the same values as those estimated by Midrigan (2011) using the monthly time 
series of monetary aggregate M1 to measure nominal aggregate demand.45 
There is no consensus in the literature regarding the value of parameter 𝜌 that 
determines the persistence of the goods-specific component of supply potentials. Fol-
lowing Costain and Nakov (2011) and Karádi and Reiff (2012), its value is set to 0.95, 
leading to highly persistent goods-specific components. 
The rest of the parameters are calibrated to allow the model to match the most 
important moments of the two empirical distributions related to micro-level price ad-
justment.46 The standard method of calibrating DSGE-type menu cost models is the sim-
ulated method of moments (SMM); this is also the easiest way to estimate the parame-
ters of agent-based models (Grazzini and Richiardi, 2015; Fagiolo et al., 2019). For these 
reasons, the remaining model parameters are estimated using SMM. According to the 
central idea of SMM, the estimated combination of parameters minimizes the average 
distance between some moments simulated by the model and their empirical counter-
parts.47 In particular, the unweighted sum of squared log deviations between the mo-
ments’ simulated and empirical values is used as a criterion function to be minimized.48 
The number of moments used for calibrating the model is the same as the number of 
estimated parameters, ensuring that the model is just identified. 
                                                          
 
44 The data are again downloaded from the FRED database of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
45 The value of 𝜑 is the same, but his estimate for 𝜎𝜉  (0.0018) is slightly greater than 0.0015. A possible 
reason for this is that this paper uses an interpolated monthly time series, which is less volatile than the 
true one. Karádi and Reiff (2019) also used the same values as Midrigan (2011). 
46 The values and the relevance of these moments are described in Section 3. 
47 See Adda and Cooper (2003) for a didactic description about the simulated method of moments. 
48 In the case of moments, which are allowed to be negative, the log deviations between their simulated 











 Table 3 contains the parameter values. The parameter values that were calibrated 
during the SMM estimation are reported separately from those assigned before the es-
timation. 
Notation Parameter Value 
Assigned Parameter Values 
𝑇 Length of a simulation 10000 
𝑁 Number of firms 500 
𝐺 Number of goods supplied by the same firm 2 
 Across-firm elasticity of substitution 3 
𝛾 Across-good elasticity of substitution 1.1 
?̅?𝑌 Steady-state gross nominal growth rate 1.0046 
𝜑 Persistence of monetary shocks 0.61 
𝜎𝜉 Standard deviation of monetary shocks 0.0015 
 Strength of demand–supply interactions 0.02 
𝜎𝜈 Standard deviation of aggregate productivity shocks 0.0002 
𝜌 Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks 0.95 
Calibrated Parameter Values 
𝛼𝑈 Strength of upward price adjustment 0.477 
𝛼𝐷 Strength of downward price adjustment 0.581 
𝑧̅ Mean price adjustment threshold 0.119 
𝜎𝑧 Standard deviation of price adjustment thresholds 0.050 
 Asymmetry of price adjustment 0.344 
?̅?𝜇 Steady-state gross potential growth rate 1.0038 
𝜎𝜁 Standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks 0.066 
𝜆 Probability of a nonzero idiosyncratic productivity shock 0.045 
𝜌𝜁  
Within-firm correlation of goods-specific productivity 
shocks 
0.553 
Table 3: The Values of the Parameters 
According to the estimates, the values of the parameters determining the 
strength of price adjustment have intermediate magnitudes. The strength of upward 
price adjustment 𝛼𝑈 is smaller than the strength of downward price adjustment 𝛼𝐷 
(0.477 versus 0.581). This is not surprising as the model reproduces EO7, which states 
that the average price increase is smaller than the average price decrease. These values 
indicate that, conditional on price adjustment, a 1% positive (negative) difference be-
tween anticipated demand for a good and its supply potential induces a 0.477% 
(0.581%) price increase (decrease). The mean price adjustment threshold 𝑧̅ is 11.9%, 
meaning that for the average firm, the weighted average difference between anticipated 
demand for its products and their supply potentials must exceed 11.9% to induce price 
adjustment. The standard deviation 𝜎𝑧 of price adjustment thresholds across firms is 
equal to 5 percentage points. The asymmetry parameter  of price adjustment is 0.344, 
implying that the weight assigned to products with anticipated excess supply is 34.4% 
smaller than the weight assigned to products with anticipated excess demand, when 











put grows by 0.38% from month to month, as ?̅?𝜇 turned out to be 1.0038. The standard 
deviation 𝜎𝜁 of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is 6.6%, which falls into the standard 
range of values found in the literature.49 The probability 𝜆 of a nonzero idiosyncratic 
productivity shock arriving is 0.045, which is again close to the standard values reported 
in the menu cost literature.50 Finally, the within-firm correlation, 𝜌𝜁 , between goods-
specific productivity shocks is 0.553, which is between the value produced by Midrigan’s 
(2011) model (0.53) and the value assumed by Kara di and Reiff (2019) (0.60). 
Moment Data Model 
Distribution of Nonzero Price Changes 
Mean (%) 1.9 1.9 
Mean size (%) 9.7 9.8 
Standard deviation (% points) 12.5 12.4 
Kurtosis 4.28 4.29 
Ratio of the mean sizes of price increases and decreases (%) 81.8 81.3 
Fraction of price increases (%) 66.0 64.7 
Fraction of small price changes (%) 28.9 29.1 
1st decile (%) 2.1 2.1 
1st quartile (%) 3.9 4.4 
Median (%) 7.2 7.6 
3rd quartile (%) 12.0 13.0 
9th decile (%) 22.3 20.3 
Frequency Distribution of Price Changes 
Mean (%) 11.6 11.6 
Standard deviation (% points) 5.4 5.3 
Skewness 0.62 0.62 
1st decile (%) 5.1 5.1 
1st quartile (%) 7.4 7.4 
Median (%) 11.1 11.3 
3rd quartile (%) 14.7 14.9 
9th decile (%) 19.2 17.9 
An Additional Moment 
Mean year-on-year inflation rate (%) 2.60 1.59 
Note: The moments targeted during the SMM estimation are underlined. The fraction of small price 
changes is the fraction of price changes smaller than half of the mean size of nonzero price changes. In the 
case of the distribution of nonzero price changes, the quantiles refer to the percentiles of the size distribu-
tion of nonzero price changes. The empirical value of the mean year-on-year inflation rate is the mean 
year-on-year growth rate of the price level in the U.S. between 1989 and 1997 measured by the GDP-
deflator. 
Table 4: The Values of Targeted and Non-Targeted Moments 
in the Empirical Data and the Data Simulated by the Model 
                                                          
49 Note that the standard deviation of the goods-specific component 𝛿𝑖,𝑔,𝑡  of the supply potential is 
𝜎𝜁 √1 − 𝜌
2⁄ = 0.210, that is, 21.0%. 











Table 4 can be used to assess the model’s goodness of fit by comparing the values 
of moments in the empirical and the simulated data; the values of moments that have 
been targeted during the SMM estimation are underlined. The model can almost perfect-
ly match all the targeted moments of the two empirical distributions. Some of the most 
important quantiles of the two distributions are also reported in Table 4. These have not 
been targeted during the SMM estimation. However, the model can still match them sat-
isfactorily, indicating that it can reproduce the whole shapes of the empirical distribu-
tions sufficiently well, not just some of their moments targeted during the estimation. 
The mean year-on-year inflation rate is 1.59% in the model, which is around 1 percent-
age point below the mean annual inflation rate in the U.S. between 1989 and 1997, 
measured to be 2.60% by the GDP-deflator. However, this is not necessarily a model de-
ficiency as the rate of trend inflation inherent in the Dominick’s dataset is possibly dif-
ferent from the general rate of trend inflation in the U.S. during the period when the da-
taset was collected.51 Nevertheless, the model’s 1.59% trend inflation rate can be re-
garded as a realistic magnitude. In summation, the model’s empirical fit can be consid-
ered satisfactory; hence, it is suited to determine estimates about the long-run real ef-
fects of monetary shocks in the U.S. during a normal period, such as between 1989 and 
1997. 
 5. THE LONG-RUN REAL EFFECT OF A TYPICAL MONETARY SHOCK 
In this section, the hybrid menu cost model presented in Section 4 is used to esti-
mate the long-run real effect of a typical positive monetary shock in the U.S. during nor-
mal times. The growth rate of nominal aggregate demand is hit with a transitory shock, 
which leads to a permanent increase in its level. Then, it is observed if there are any forc-
es in the model that are expected to lead real aggregate output back to its initial steady-
state value in the long run. If there are such forces, LRMN holds. If there are no such 
forces, LRMNN occurs. 
Figure 2 presents the impulse responses of the most important aggregate varia-
bles to a typical, one standard deviation positive monetary shock. Inflation on the figure 
is denoted by 𝑃%. 
LRMN fails in the model as the real aggregate output is not expected to return to 
its initial level as the monetary shock dies away. Instead, it settles into a permanently 
higher-level steady-state growth path. A one standard deviation monetary shock is 
equivalent to a 0.15 percentage point transitory shock to the growth rate of nominal 
aggregate demand and a 0.39% permanent shock to its level. When the path of nominal 
aggregate demand reaches its new steady-state level, the path of real aggregate output is 
expected to settle down to a new steady-state level that is 0.09% higher than on the 
baseline path. The price level path is expected to converge to a new steady-state level 
                                                          
51 The trend inflation rate of typical goods sold in grocery stores between 1989 and 1997 could have been 
lower than the general rate of trend inflation in the U.S. Unfortunately, the large number of missing values 
makes it impossible to calculate the trend inflation rate inherent in the Dominick’s dataset. An alternative 
would be to calculate the mean annual growth rate of the producer price index of grocery stores. However, 
the earliest year that the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics reports this price index for, is 2003, which is out-











0.30% above the baseline. The 0.09% long-run real effect is significantly different from 
0% as 79.22% of the 10,000 trajectories, the average of which approximates the impulse 
response function of real aggregate output, is above 0% 300 periods, that is, 25 years 
after the arrival of the shock.52 This fraction is significantly greater than 50%, at all rea-
sonable levels of significance.53 
 
 
Note: The notations are the following. 𝑄: real aggregate output, 𝑃: price level, 𝑃%: inflation rate, 𝑌: nomi-
nal aggregate demand, 𝑡: period index. A period in the model corresponds to one month. 
Figure 2: The Impulse Responses of Real Aggregate Output, the Price Level, and Inflation 
to a One Standard Deviation Positive Permanent Shock to the Level of Nominal Aggre-
gate Demand 
The long-run effectiveness of the monetary shock is measured with its fraction, 
which is expected to pass through to real aggregate output in the long run. This fraction 
is termed the long-run pass-through to output. It can theoretically be calculated as the 
                                                          
52 Three-hundred periods are sufficient for the model to get close enough to a steady state after the arrival 
of a monetary shock. Three-hundred periods correspond to 300 months, that is, 25 years in the model. 
53 A 𝑧-test was performed for the null hypothesis that the fraction of trajectories above 0% 300 periods 
after the arrival of the shock is equal to 50% against the one-sided alternative that it is greater than 50%. 

















































ratio of the value of the impulse response function of real aggregate output to that of 






where 𝐿𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑄 denotes the long-run pass-through to output, and 𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑡
𝑋 is the value of the 
impulse response function of variable 𝑋 𝑡 periods after the period preceding the arrival 
of the shock. In practice, 𝐼𝑅𝐹∞
𝑋 is approximated by 𝐼𝑅𝐹300
𝑋  for any variable 𝑋. 
 In the case of the one standard deviation positive monetary shock, 𝐿𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑄 is 
equal to 0.2308, which means that 23.08% (around one-quarter) of a typical positive 
monetary shock is expected to pass through to real aggregate output in the long run. The 
remaining 76.92% (around three-quarters) is expected to be absorbed by the price level. 
This implies that the long-run real effects of monetary shocks must have been substan-
tial in the U.S. between 1989 and 1997, suggesting that LRMNN is more than an interest-
ing theoretical possibility; it has considerable practical importance for monetary policy. 
Few econometric estimates can be found in the literature about the long-run real 
effects of monetary shocks. Using annual U.S. data from 1869–1975, Fisher and Seater 
(1993) estimated that a 1% permanent increase in the level of the money supply is ex-
pected to lead to a 0.5% permanent increase in real GDP. Atesoglu (2001) estimated a 
cointegrating vector between money supply and real income using annual U.S. data from 
1875–1998 and found that the long-run coefficient of the money supply is around 0.5. 
Both estimates suggest that 𝐿𝑅𝑃𝑇𝑄 must be around 50% empirically, implying that the 
hybrid menu cost model underestimates the long-run real effects of monetary shocks, 
compared to the two cited empirical studies. However, because of the endogeneity of 
cointegrated variables, the elements of a cointegrating vector cannot be interpreted as 
estimates of causal effects (Enders, 2015). De Grauwe and Costa Storti (2004) carried 
out a meta-analysis and estimated that a 1 percentage point increase in the nominal in-
terest rate is expected to decrease real output by 0.16% in the long run. Jorda et al. 
(2020) estimated a much larger long-run real effect, to the same 1 percentage point in-
crease in the nominal interest rate, equal to a 4.68% drop in real output in the long 
run.54 These estimates are difficult to compare with the one produced by the hybrid 
menu cost model as this paper follows the usual methodology applied in the menu cost 
literature and does not explicitly model the interest rate decisions of the central bank. 
6. INSPECTING THE MECHANISMS 
In this section, the hybrid nature of the menu cost model is exploited to deter-
mine the roles that nonlinear price adjustment and demand–supply interactions play in 
the emergence of LRMNN. By turning the post-Keynesian and ACE features of the model 
on and off, it can be made clear how they influence the behavior of an otherwise stand-
ard menu cost model. Some simplified model variants will be studied, with some fea-
tures turned on and some turned off. The parameters of these simple model variants are 
                                                          
54 This estimate is obtained using their full sample containing annual data about 17 countries from 1890–











again estimated with SMM. Their values and the simulated values of the moments of the 
two distributions related to micro-level price adjustment can be found in Online Appen-
dix D.55 
All features that have been introduced just to improve the model’s fit to the em-
pirical data, are turned off. The resulting variants of the model will make it possible to 
focus on the roles played by nonlinear price adjustment and demand–supply interac-
tions purely in the emergence of LRMNN. Further model features, which may also influ-
ence the emergence of LRMNN, will be introduced step by step. Specifically, all the mod-
el’s simple variants share the following simplifying assumptions: 
 Firms are assumed to be homogenous concerning their price adjustment thresh-
olds (𝜎𝑧 = 0), implying equally frequent price changes for all products. 
 Single-product firms are assumed instead of multiproduct ones (𝐺 = 1)56, that is, 
each firm supplies a single product variety. 
 Trend growth is assumed away from nominal aggregate demand (?̅?𝑌 = 1) and, 
hence, trend inflation disappears. In the absence of trend inflation, there is no 
reason for firms to give asymmetric responses to positive and negative monetary 
shocks and, thus, price adjustment becomes symmetric ( = 0 and 𝛼𝑈 = 𝛼𝐷). 
 Potential growth, that is, trend growth in the aggregate component of supply po-
tentials, is assumed away (?̅?𝜇 = 1). 
 Aggregate productivity shocks are assumed away (𝜎𝜈 = 0) and, hence, idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks remain the only sources of variation in the supply po-
tentials. 
 The probability distribution of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is assumed to be 
normal instead of leptokurtic (𝜆 = 1), that is, a normally distributed shock ar-
rives in each period instead of arriving infrequently. 
The starting point of the analysis is the benchmark model variant, labeled BM 
(Benchmark), which, does not contain any of the two features believed to generate 
LRMNN by post-Keynesian economists. This is based on three further simplifying as-
sumptions: firms are not hit by idiosyncratic productivity shocks (𝜎𝜁 = 0) and, as such, 
supply potentials are constant; there are no demand–supply interactions ( = 0); and 
price adjustment is free, there are no menu costs to pay. The latter implies that the price 
adjustment threshold is zero for all firms (𝑧𝑖 = 0 for ∀𝑖). Under these assumptions, firms 
become homogeneous; they all set the same price, and demand function (1) simplifies to 
𝑐𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 𝑁𝑝𝑡⁄  for all product varieties. If firms were perfectly rational, they would recog-
nize this and set the price to 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 𝑁?̅?⁄ . This would perfectly coordinate demand with 
the supply potentials, and each firm would always produce a constant ?̅? amount of out-
                                                          
55 None of the simple model variants is sophisticated enough to reproduce all important empirical obser-
vations about micro-level price adjustment reported in Section 3. However, this section focuses on the 
qualitative implications of the model variants regarding LRMNN and not on their quantitative predictions; 
hence, it is not crucial to achieve satisfying goodness of fit. 
56 Note that the total number of product varieties sold in the market is kept at 𝑁 × 𝐺 = 1000; hence, de-










put.57 Thus, under perfect rationality and no price rigidity, monetary shocks would fully 
pass through to the price level; they would have no real effects in the short or long run. 
However, firms are boundedly rational in the model; they make their pricing de-
cisions according to heuristic rule (3). The impulse response of the benchmark model 
variant to a two-standard deviation monetary shock is presented in Figure 3.58 The 
monetary shock has a small short-run real effect as boundedly rational firms cannot op-
timally react to the shock in the short run, resulting in too weak price adjustment and 
little real adjustment. In the long run, firms learn to adapt to the monetary shock by in-
creasing their prices in response to the excess demand, neutralizing the shock’s real ef-
fect. It can be concluded that the simple form of bounded rationality manifested in pric-
ing decision rule (3) cannot explain LRMNN in the model, but it results in some small 
short-run real effects in response to monetary shocks. 
6.1. Nonlinear Price Adjustment 
Now, the nonlinearity of price adjustment is examined to determine whether it 
can explain the failure of LRMN in the model. Nonlinear price adjustment is turned on in 
the benchmark model variant, that is, positive price adjustment thresholds are assumed 
(𝑧̅ > 0). The resulting model variant is labeled BM + NLPA, and its impulse response to a 
two-standard deviation monetary shock is presented in Figure 3. 
Nonlinear price adjustment leads to the failure of LRMN in model variant BM + 
NLPA. In the first few periods, nominal demand growth fully transforms into real output 
growth as firms do not adjust their prices in response to small deviations between de-
mand and the supply potential. However, when their deviation grows large enough, 
firms become willing to pay the menu cost and increase prices. Real output falls as a 
consequence but immediately starts rising again as nominal aggregate demand increas-
es further. This time, real demand does not get far enough from the supply potential to 
encourage firms to pay the menu cost. Hence, prices do not increase anymore, and real 
aggregate demand remains permanently higher when nominal aggregate demand settles 
to its new, higher steady-state level. Consequently, the quantities of all product varieties 
become permanently higher in the new steady state, implying that LRMN fails.59 
                                                          
57 Profits would be maximal if the output was equal to the supply potential, interpreted in Subsection 4.3 
as the amount of output, which is the most cost-efficient to produce. Total revenues are 𝑝𝑡𝑞𝑡 =
𝑝𝑡(𝑌𝑡 𝑁𝑝𝑡⁄ ) = 𝑌𝑡 𝑁⁄ , which is independent of firm decisions. In this case, profits are maximal if the firm 
produces at the lowest possible cost level. 
58 Under the calibration presented in Online Appendix D, a one standard deviation shock would not be 
large enough to induce firms in model variants BM + NLPA and BM + NLPA + DynOpt to change their pric-
es. This section focuses on the qualitative implications of the simple model variants and not on their quan-
titative predictions. 
59 One might argue that the discrete jumps observable in the impulse response functions may be realistic 
at the micro-level but not at the macro level of the economy. The working version of this paper (Váry, 
2020) shows that the impulse response functions become continuous if firms are assumed to be heteroge-
neous concerning their price adjustment thresholds as they start adjusting their prices to the monetary 













Note: The notations are the following. 𝑄: real aggregate output, 𝑃: price level, 𝑃%: inflation rate, 𝑌: 
nominal aggregate demand, 𝑡: period index. A period corresponds to amonth. BM refers to the benchmark 
model variant that contains boundedly rational firms, linear price adjustment, and no demand–supply 
interactions. BM + NLPA is the benchmark model variant with nonlinear price adjustment. BM + NLPA + 
DynOpt is the benchmark model variant with nonlinear price adjustment and dynamically optimizing 
firms. BM + NLPA + IID is the benchmark model variant with nonlinear price adjustment and idiosyncratic 
productivity shocks. 
Figure 3: The Impulse Responses of Real Aggregate Output, the Price Level and Inflation 
to a Two Standard Deviation Positive Permanent Shock 
to the Level of Nominal Aggregate Demand in the Benchmark Model Variant 
and in Model Variants BM + NLPA, BM + NLPA + DynOpt and BM + NLPA + IID 
So far, it seems that nonlinear price adjustment can explain LRMN’s failure in the 
model consistently with the post-Keynesian view, but the question remains as to why 
LRMNN does not arise in DSGE-type menu cost models. A possible reason is that firms 
are assumed to be perfectly rational within their framework, and they decide their pric-
es by solving a dynamic profit maximization problem. In Figure 3, the quantities pro-
duced deviate permanently from the supply potentials in the new steady state of model 
variant BM + NLPA, causing infinitely large losses for firms in the long run, compared to 
the maximal attainable profit stream under flexible prices. A forward-looking firm may 
notice this and be willing to pay the finite menu cost in the present to avoid infinitely 
large expected future losses. Thus, it may revert the price to its flexible-price steady-













BM + NLPA + DynOpt













BM + NLPA + DynOpt












BM + NLPA + DynOpt





















A version of model variant BM + NLPA, containing dynamically optimizing firms, 
was built to assess the validity of this argument. It is labeled BM + NLPA + DynOpt. In 
this model variant, firms maximize their values, that is, the present value of their ex-
pected profit streams on an infinite horizon. Profits are assumed to depend negatively 
on the squared relative difference between actual output and the supply potential. In the 
case of price adjustment, they are decreased by the menu cost as well.60 Firms choose 
between changing and maintaining prices by comparing their expected values in the two 
cases. Their dynamic profit maximization problem is solved numerically, using value 
function iteration. The technical details can be found in Online Appendix E. 
Figure 3 clarifies that despite the preliminary expectations, the assumption of dy-
namically optimizing firms does not eliminate LRMNN from model variant BM + NLPA. 
The explanation is that firms discount their expected future streams of profits during 
their pricing decisions. After discounting, the present value of the infinitely large ex-
pected losses caused by the lack of perfect price adjustment becomes finite. Hence, if the 
difference between the actual output and the supply potential is not too large, it is not 
optimal to pay the finite menu cost in the present to avoid expected losses in the distant 
future that may not even be realized at all. This means that the assumption of dynami-
cally optimizing firms cannot be the reason why LRMN holds in DSGE-type menu cost 
models. 
Another possible explanation for the prevalence of LRMN in DSGE-type menu 
cost models is the assumption that idiosyncratic productivity shocks hit the firms. Model 
variant BM + NLPA + IID extends model variant BM + NLPA with such shocks (𝜎𝜁 > 0).61 
It can be seen in Figure 3 that the introduction of idiosyncratic productivity shocks elim-
inates LRMNN from model variant BM + NLPA. Firms are expected to be hit by micro-
level productivity shocks as the monetary shock dies away. Sooner or later, each firm is 
expected to face an idiosyncratic shock that is large enough to push its supply potential 
sufficiently far from anticipated demand to induce price adjustment. If the firm adjusts 
its price because of the idiosyncratic shock, it will also respond to the monetary shock. 
Thus, idiosyncratic productivity shocks are expected to result in perfect price adjust-
ment in the long run, reverting real output to its initial steady-state value. This result 
clarifies that the reason why nonlinear price adjustment does not lead to LRMNN in 
DSGE-type menu cost models is that the menu cost assumption is complemented with 
the assumption that idiosyncratic productivity shocks hit the firms. 
Idiosyncratic productivity shocks need to be key ingredients of an empirically 
relevant menu cost model; they are necessary to make the model able to reproduce the 
large mean size of empirical price changes (Golosov and Lucas, 2007) and the overall 
shape of the empirical distribution of nonzero price changes (Midrigan, 2011). Table D.2 
in Online Appendix D illustrates that the simple model variants without idiosyncratic 
productivity shocks cannot reproduce the large mean size of empirical price changes. 
The importance of idiosyncratic productivity shocks is stressed by numerous empirical 
studies as well, according to which most of the variation observed in firm- or plant-level 
                                                          
60 The assumed shape of the profit function can again be motivated by the fact that revenues will eventual-
ly be independent of firm decisions under the assumption of homogeneous firms, and production is as-
sumed to be the most cost-efficient at the supply potential. 











productivity is because of idiosyncratic factors (Bergoeing et al., 2003; Ábrahám and 
White, 2006; Bachmann and Bayer, 2013; Castro et al., 2015). Thus, it can be concluded 
that the first post-Keynesian explanation for the failure of LRMN, which is a type of non-
linear price adjustment involving the existence of a price adjustment threshold, can lead 
to LRMNN in some simple theoretical models. Still, these models do not seem to be sup-
ported by the empirical data.62 The full-fledged variant of the menu cost model present-
ed in Section 4 contains idiosyncratic productivity shocks. Hence, the type of nonlinear 
price adjustment that involves the existence of a price adjustment threshold cannot be 
the reason it produces significant long-run real effects in response to monetary shocks. 
6.2. Demand–Supply Interactions 
Next, the paper examines if demand–supply interactions alone can explain the 
failure of LRMN in the model. In a case of perfect rationality and no price rigidity, de-
mand–supply interactions cannot occur as the output gap is always zero. Hence, they 
cannot induce any changes in potential output. Therefore, the starting point of the anal-
ysis is the same benchmark model variant as the one already presented, which contains 
boundedly rational firms, linear price adjustment, and no demand–supply interactions. 
It has been established that LRMN holds in this model variant. 
Demand–supply interactions are turned on in the benchmark model variant ( >
0), and the resulting model variant is labeled BM + DSI. Its impulse response to a one 
standard deviation monetary shock is presented in Figure 4. Demand–supply interac-
tions lead to the failure of LRMN in model variant BM + DSI. The bounded rationality of 
pricing decisions results in a small short-run real effect in response to the monetary 
shock, generating a positive output gap, which increases potential output through the 
mechanisms of demand–supply interactions. As nominal aggregate demand approaches 
its new steady-state level, firms gradually raise their prices in response to the excess 
demand. The unfolding process of price adjustment increases the price level, reducing 
real aggregate demand and output. However, firms adjust to higher supply potentials 
than those prevalent before the arrival of the monetary shock, the result of which is that 
real aggregate output remains permanently higher when nominal aggregate demand 
settles down at its new, higher steady-state level. Thus, LRMN fails. 
Nonlinear price adjustment is necessary for the model to reproduce the most im-
portant moments of the empirical frequency distribution of price changes, and idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks are necessary to reproduce those of the empirical distribution 
of nonzero price changes. Model variant BM + NLPA + IID + DSI augments model variant 
BM + DSI with these two features (𝑧̅ > 0 and 𝜎𝜁 > 0). Its impulse response, presented in 
Figure 4, shows that LRMN fails within its framework, as well. Unlike the long-run real 
effects of monetary shocks generated by nonlinear price adjustment, idiosyncratic 
productivity shocks do not eliminate LRMNN generated by demand–supply interactions. 
Thus, it can be concluded that the presence of demand–supply interactions as the second 
                                                          
62 Of course, it is theoretically possible to find a new assumption to replace the arrival of idiosyncratic 
productivity shocks in assuring satisfying empirical performance for a menu cost model, which does not 
eliminate LRMNN generated by nonlinear price adjustment. However, it is not a trivial task to find such an 











post-Keynesian explanation for the failure of LRMN can generate LRMNN in an empiri-
cally relevant way. This is why monetary shocks have long-run real effects in the full-
fledged variant of the hybrid menu cost model presented in Section 4. 
 
 
Note: The notations are the following. 𝑄: real aggregate output, 𝑃: price level, 𝑃%: inflation rate, 𝑌: nomi-
nal aggregate demand, 𝑡: period index. A period corresponds to a month. BM refers to the benchmark 
model variant that contains boundedly rational firms, linear price adjustment, and no demand–supply 
interactions. BM + DSI is the benchmark model variant with demand–supply interactions. BM + NLPA + 
IID + DSI is the benchmark model variant with nonlinear price adjustment, idiosyncratic productivity 
shocks, and demand–supply interactions. 
Figure 4: The Impulse Responses of Real Aggregate Output, the Price Level and Inflation 
to a One Standard Deviation Positive Permanent Shock to the Level 
of Nominal Aggregate Demand in the Benchmark Model Variant 
and in Model Variants BM + DSI and BM + NLPA + IID +DSI 
However, it is worth noting that in Figure 4, the long-run real effect of a monetary 
shock is much larger if demand–supply interactions are coupled with nonlinear price 
adjustment. This is because price rigidity generates a much larger short-run real effect 
in response to the shock than the bounded rationality of pricing decisions alone. In other 
words, demand–supply interactions transform larger short-run real effects into corre-
spondingly larger long-run real effects. Despite the inability of nonlinear price adjust-



























































relevant way, it plays an important role in determining their magnitude once they are 
brought to life by demand–supply interactions. 
 The key role of demand–supply interactions in the emergence of LRMNN raises 
the question of how sensitive the long-run real effect of a typical monetary shock is to 
their strength. Online Appendix F shows that the long-run effectiveness of such a shock is 
substantially influenced by the strength of demand–supply interactions in the full-
fledged variant of the hybrid menu cost model. However, the standard error of the esti-
mated strength of demand–supply interactions in Table 2 is only 0.0013, implying a ra-
ther narrow ±2 standard error confidence band for the value of parameter : 
(0.018, 0.021). If  were assumed to be equal to the lower bound of this confidence 
band, the model would predict that 21.97% of a typical monetary shock would pass 
through to real output in the long run, which is only slightly below the 23.08% long-run 
pass-through predicted under the baseline parameterization of = 0.02. Hence, even 
under a conservative assumption about the strength of demand–supply interactions, the 
long-run effectiveness of a typical monetary shock is estimated to be substantial. 
7. THE EFFECT OF THE SIZE AND THE SIGN OF A MONETARY 
SHOCK ON ITS LONG-RUN EFFECTIVENESS 
This section returns to the full-fledged variant of the hybrid menu cost model 
presented in Section 4 to discover how the size and the sign of a monetary shock influ-
ence its long-run effectiveness. 
7.1. The Effect of the Shock Size on the Long-Run Effectiveness of a Monetary 
Shock 
Section 5 presents the result regarding the substantial long-real effect of a typical 
positive monetary shock. The finding seemingly indicates a simple secret to successful 
monetary policy: central banks need to hit the economy with an infinitely large positive 
monetary shock, and real output will rocket to infinity. This subsection shows that pur-
suing such a monetary policy is unwise, even if LRMN does not hold. 
Figure 5 presents the long-run effectiveness of a monetary shock in the model as 
a function of its size, separately for positive and negative shocks.63 The long-run effec-
tiveness of a shock is measured by its long-run pass-through to output. First, only the 
case of positive shocks is considered. It is apparent that the larger the monetary shock, 
the smaller its fraction passed through to real output in the long run; thus, the effective-
ness of long-run expansionary monetary policy decreases with the size of the shock. At 
the same time, the fraction of the shock passed through to the price level in the long run 
increases. Thus, the long-run real effects of large monetary expansions are probably too 
small to compensate for their inflationary effects, implying that it is not rational for cen-
tral banks to target unlimited increases in real output. 
                                                          
63 As mentioned in Subsection 4.4, 10,000 independent replications were typically simulated with different 
random draws for the productivity shocks to approximate the impulse response functions. For creating 












Figure 5: The Long-Run Effectiveness of a Monetary Shock in the Model 
as a Function of its Size in Cases of Positive and Negative Shocks 
It is useful to turn to a well-known finding from the existing literature (Klenow 
and Kryvtsov, 2008; Costain and Nakov, 2011; Karádi and Reiff, 2012) to determine the 
reasons behind the decreasing effectiveness of long-run expansionary monetary policy 
as a function of the shock size. The extant literature shows that the short-run pass-
through of a monetary shock to the price level can be decomposed into three compo-
nents as follows: 
1. Intensive margin: Desired price changes become larger as a consequence of the 
monetary shock. 
2. Extensive margin: The fraction of firms adjusting their prices increases because of 
the monetary shock. 
3. Selection effect: The monetary shock alters the composition of price adjusters. 
Firms with larger than average desired price changes turn into price adjusters 
with a higher probability. 
In the model, price adjustment is stronger in the long run if it is stronger in the 
short run because according to Equation (4), the long-run real effects of monetary 
shocks to potential output are determined by their short-run real effects on the output 
gap. Hence, the three components of short-run price adjustment are important determi-
nants of the strength of long-run price adjustment as well. Karádi and Reiff (2012) 
showed that the fraction of a monetary shock passed through to the price level because 
of price adjustment on the intensive margin stays constant as the shock size increases. 





















































nonlinearly as the size of the shock becomes larger. The strength of the selection effect 
depends crucially on the assumed probability distribution of idiosyncratic productivity 
shocks.64 
 In the context of the hybrid menu cost model, this means that the reason why the 
long-run effectiveness of a monetary shock decreases with its size is that more firms 
adjust their prices in the short run in response to larger shocks. Consequently, their 
short-run effectiveness becomes lower. Hence, demand–supply interactions will lead to 
lower long-run effectiveness. 
 It is worth noting that in Figure 5, although the long-run effectiveness of a mone-
tary shock decreases with the shock size, it remains slightly positive even for very large 
shocks.65 This is initially surprising because practically all firms react to very large mon-
etary shocks by adjusting their prices in the short run, that is, price adjustment is perfect 
on the extensive margin. However, it is not perfect on the intensive margin because of 
the firms’ boundedly rational pricing decisions. This opens the way for small short-run 
real effects to emerge even in response to very large monetary shocks. When demand–
supply interactions take place, small short-run real effects transform into small long-run 
real effects. 
7.2. The Asymmetric Long-Run Real Effects of Positive and Negative Mone-
tary Shocks 
 A considerable amount of empirical evidence suggests that the short-run real ef-
fects of positive and negative monetary shocks are asymmetric; positive monetary 
shocks seem to be less effective in the short run than negative ones (DeLong and Sum-
mers, 1988; Cover, 1992; Morgan, 1993).66 This subsection examines if this asymmetry 
can also be observed in the hybrid menu cost model between their long-run effective-
ness. 
The long-run pass-through to output in cases of positive and negative monetary 
shocks can be compared in Figure 5 for different shock sizes. There is an intermediate 
range of the shock size, within which negative monetary shocks are more effective in the 
long run than positive ones; however, positive shocks are more effective outside of this 
range. The intermediate range of the shock size is roughly between 1% and 4%.67 
 The asymmetric results can be explained as follows. Karádi and Reiff (2012) 
showed that the role of the extensive margin in price adjustment to small monetary 
shocks is negligible. Hence, for small shock sizes, the intensive margin dominates price 
adjustment. However, price adjustment on the intensive margin is stronger in response 
to negative shocks than to positive ones. This is because the strength of downward price 
                                                          
64 If their distribution is leptokurtic, as in the model, the selection effect is weak for small shock sizes; its 
importance increases substantially for medium-sized shocks and starts decreasing again for large shock 
sizes. 
65 The long-run pass-through to output is equal to 6% in case of a 50% positive monetary shock, and it is 
5.03% for a 100% positive monetary shock. 
66 See Florio (2004) for a survey about the potential explanations of this empirical finding. 
67 Considering that the standard deviation of monetary shocks is estimated to be 0.15%, the size of a shock 
is not very likely to fall into this range but it is not impossible. According to the results of Karádi and Reiff 
(2019), the changes in the Hungarian VAT rate in 2006 can be considered to be equivalent to monetary 











adjustment 𝛼𝐷 is calibrated to be greater than the strength of upward price adjustment 
𝛼𝑈 to allow the model to reproduce EO7, according to which the mean size of price de-
creases is empirically larger than that of price increases. Consequently, the short-run 
real effects of small positive shocks will be larger than those of small negative ones. This 
asymmetry survives after the short-run real effects transform into long-run real effects 
through demand–supply interactions. 
 As the size of the monetary shock increases, the extensive margin begins to play 
an increasingly important role in price adjustment; however, the shock size at which it 
becomes dominant is larger in the case of negative shocks than in that of positive ones. If 
the size of a positive monetary shock starts increasing, the fraction of price adjuster 
firms will increase together with it immediately. However, suppose the size of a negative 
monetary shock starts increasing. In this case, firms wait first for trend inflation to dete-
riorate their relative prices, allowing them to save on the menu cost of price adjust-
ment.68 This leads to the emergence of the intermediate range of the shock size, within 
which macro-level price adjustment to negative monetary shocks is weaker than to posi-
tive ones; hence, the real effects of negative shocks become larger. 
 Above a sufficiently large shock size, price adjustment on the extensive margin 
becomes practically perfect for both positive and negative shocks. In such situations, the 
difference between their real effects is determined by the intensive margin again. Hence, 
positive monetary shocks again become more effective than negative ones. 
 The results indicate that small positive monetary shocks are more effective than 
negative ones, which is not in line with the empirical evidence cited above.69 However, 
price adjustment must be calibrated stronger downward than upward to allow the mod-
el to reproduce the empirically observable difference between the mean size of price 
increases and decreases. Nevertheless, more research needs to be done to reconcile 
these model predictions with the empirical evidence. An interesting possibility is to con-
sider the nonlinearity of price adjustment during the empirical study of the asymmetric 
real effects.70 
 8. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 This paper studied whether heterogeneous micro-level price adjustment to mon-
etary shocks, coupled with two economic mechanisms believed to explain LRMNN by 
post-Keynesian economists, leads to economically significant long-run real effects at the 
macro level. The positive results were based on a hybrid menu cost model that combines 
insights from DSGE-type menu cost models with ideas from post-Keynesian monetary 
macroeconomics, and the behavior of which was studied via agent-based simulations. 
                                                          
68 This is a standard result of menu cost models with trend inflation (Ball and Mankiw, 1994; Karádi and 
Reiff, 2019). 
69 However, note that the empirical evidence is about the asymmetry between the short-run real effects of 
positive and negative monetary shocks and not about the asymmetry between their long-run real effects. 
70 Another possibility is to assume in the model that demand–supply interactions are stronger in cases of 
negative demand shocks than in those of positive ones. This assumption would be in line with some em-
pirical evidence (Ball, 2009) and would help the model produce larger long-run real effects in response to 
small negative monetary shocks, but it would not lead to different predictions concerning the asymmetry 











The model was calibrated to match the most important moments of two empirical dis-
tributions related to micro-level price adjustment. 
 The long-run real effect of a typical monetary shock was estimated to be substan-
tial, with around one-quarter of the shock passing through to real aggregate output in 
the long run. It turned out that demand–supply interactions are the key post-Keynesian 
mechanisms responsible for the emergence of LRMNN in the model. Nonlinear price ad-
justment, interpreted to be equivalent to the existence of a price adjustment threshold, 
is the other economic mechanism believed to lead to LRMNN by post-Keynesians; how-
ever, it was unable to explain the failure of LRMN in the model under empirically rele-
vant conditions. Still, it was shown to fundamentally influence the magnitude of the 
long-run real effects of monetary shocks once they are brought to life by demand–supply 
interactions. The long-run effectiveness of a monetary shock was shown to decrease 
with its size, suggesting that it is not rational for central banks to target an unlimited 
increase in real output, even if LRMN fails. Finally, the long-run effectiveness of positive 
and negative monetary shocks is asymmetric in the model, under the assumed pricing 
decision rule allowing for different strengths of price adjustment in response to positive 
and negative shocks. Within an intermediate range of the shock size, the long-run effec-
tiveness of negative shocks in the model is larger than that of positive ones, while posi-
tive shocks are more effective outside of this range. 
 The results have important implications for the conduct of monetary policy. If the 
long-run real effects of monetary shocks are substantial, then there is no divine coinci-
dence and strict inflation targeting cannot be the optimal monetary policy. Central banks 
should put more emphasis on real economic activity during their policy decisions than 
under LRMN. It is suggested that they follow the flexible opportunistic approach of infla-
tion targeting put forward by Fontana and Palacio-Vera (2007) and target additional 
real variables besides the output gap (Galí, 2020; Garga and Singh, 2021). The results 
also serve as arguments in favor of the policy of price-level targeting (Svensson, 1999; 
Gaspar et al., 2010; Evans, 2012; Bernanke, 2019). 
 There are three major ways of continuing the research. First, more empirical 
work should be done to understand the channels of demand–supply interactions and the 
monetary transmission mechanism through which the long-run real effects of monetary 
shocks are manifested. This would contribute to producing a better-founded economet-
ric estimate regarding the strength of demand–supply interactions and, thereby, the 
long-run real effects of monetary shocks. It would also help support demand–supply 
interactions with proper microeconomic foundations, making it possible to develop pol-
icy recommendations about influencing the long-run real effects of monetary shocks.  
Second, it would be very useful to study this paper’s research questions within 
the framework of a complex agent-based macro model. The hybrid menu cost model 
presented in this paper only contains the goods market of an economy. DSGE-type menu 
cost models contain a stylized labor market and a bond market, but their roles in deter-
mining the real effects of monetary shocks are negligible. An agent-based macro model 
would make it possible to develop detailed microeconomic foundations for demand–
supply interactions, thereby to understand which segments of the economy, unrelated to 











Third, this paper did not consider the possible role of any demand-side mecha-
nism in generating LRMNN. However, money illusion, which prevents households from 
fully adjusting their reservation wages to changes in the price level, can also result in a 
long-run trade-off between inflation and real economic activity (Akerlof et al., 2000). It 
would be interesting to study how strongly money illusion amplifies the long-run real 
effects of monetary shocks found in this paper. 
 Nevertheless, the results presented in this paper provide useful foundations for 
future research for at least two reasons. First, they point out that the key for the emer-
gence of substantial long-run real effects in response to monetary shocks is the existence 
of demand–supply interactions, and their exact forms are of secondary importance. Sec-
ond, ACE macro models are often criticized for being black boxes; they are often too 
complex to easily clarify the economic mechanisms behind their novel implications. As 
the structure of the hybrid menu cost model in this paper mimics DSGE-type menu cost 
models, it was possible to clarify the roles of its post-Keynesian and agent-based fea-
tures in determining the long-run real effects of monetary shocks. Thus, the model sheds 
light on the economic mechanisms needed to be key ingredients of a complex agent-
based macro model for studying the long-run real effects of monetary shocks. Because of 
the findings arrived at with the hybrid menu cost model, it will also be easier to inter-
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Variable ∆ log ?̅?𝑡 ?̂?𝑡 ∆ log ?̅?𝑡 ?̂?𝑡 










Sample 1989-1997 1989-1997 1949-2018 1949-2018 
Frequency Monthly Monthly Monthly Monthly 
Number of observations 103 103 826 820 
Note: The test equations include an intercept and a deterministic time trend. The optimal lag length is 
selected according to the Schwarz information criterion. * - significance at 𝑝 < 0.10, ** - significance at 𝑝 <
0.05, *** - significance at 𝑝 < 0.01. 
Table 1: The Results of Augmented Dickey–Fuller Tests 

















𝜎𝜈 0.0002 0.0007 0.0006 
Constant Yes Yes Yes 
Sample 1989-1997 1949-2018 1989-1997 
Frequency Monthly Monthly Quarterly 
𝑅2 0.68 0.26 0.68 
Number of observations 107 839 35 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * - significance at 𝑝 < 0.10, ** - significance at 𝑝 < 0.05, *** - 
significance at 𝑝 < 0.01. 
Table 2: OLS Estimates of the Strength of Demand–Supply Interactions 









Notation Parameter Value 
Assigned Parameter Values 
𝑇 Length of a simulation 10000 
𝑁 Number of firms 500 
𝐺 Number of goods supplied by the same firm 2 
𝜀 Across-firm elasticity of substitution 3 
𝛾 Across-good elasticity of substitution 1.1 
?̅?𝑌 Steady state gross nominal growth rate 1.0046 
𝜑 Persistence of monetary shocks 0.61 
𝜎𝜉 Standard deviation of monetary shocks 0.0015 
𝜂 Strength of demand-supply interactions 0.02 
𝜎𝜈 Standard deviation of aggregate productivity shocks 0.0002 
𝜌 Persistence of idiosyncratic productivity shocks 0.95 
Calibrated Parameter Values 
𝛼𝑈 Strength of upward price adjustment 0.477 
𝛼𝐷 Strength of downward price adjustment 0.581 
𝑧̅ Mean price adjustment threshold 0.119 
𝜎𝑧 Standard deviation of price adjustment thresholds 0.050 
𝜃 Asymmetry of price adjustment 0.344 
?̅?𝜇 Steady state gross potential growth rate 1.0038 
𝜎𝜁 Standard deviation of idiosyncratic productivity shocks 0.066 
𝜆 Probability of a nonzero idiosyncratic productivity shock 0.045 
𝜌𝜁  
Within-firm correlation of good-specific productivity 
shocks 
0.553 









Moment Data Model 
Distribution of Nonzero Price Changes 
Mean (%) 1.9 1.9 
Mean size (%) 9.7 9.8 
Standard deviation (% points) 12.5 12.4 
Kurtosis 4.28 4.29 
Ratio of the mean sizes of price increases and decreases (%) 81.8 81.3 
Fraction of price increases (%) 66.0 64.7 
Fraction of small price changes (%) 28.9 29.1 
1st decile (%) 2.1 2.1 
1st quartile (%) 3.9 4.4 
Median (%) 7.2 7.6 
3rd quartile (%) 12.0 13.0 
9th decile (%) 22.3 20.3 
Frequency Distribution of Price Changes 
Mean (%) 11.6 11.6 
Standard deviation (% points) 5.4 5.3 
Skewness 0.62 0.62 
1st decile (%) 5.1 5.1 
1st quartile (%) 7.4 7.4 
Median (%) 11.1 11.3 
3rd quartile (%) 14.7 14.9 
9th decile (%) 19.2 17.9 
An Additional Moment 
Mean year-on-year inflation rate (%) 2.60 1.59 
Note: The moments targeted during the SMM estimation are underlined. The fraction of small price changes 
is the fraction of price changes smaller than half of the mean size of nonzero price changes. In the case of 
the distribution of nonzero price changes, the quantiles refer to the percentiles of the size distribution of 
nonzero price changes. The empirical value of the mean year-on-year inflation rate is the mean year-on-
year growth rate of the price level in the U.S. between 1989 and 1997 measured by the GDP-deflator. 
Table 4: The Values of Targeted and Non-Targeted Moments 












































































































BM + NLPA + DynOpt













BM + NLPA + DynOpt












BM + NLPA + DynOpt



























































































































Manuscript: The Long-Run Real Effects of Monetary Shocks: Lessons from a Hybrid 
Post-Keynesian-DSGE-Agent-Based Menu Cost Model 
 A hybrid menu cost model is developed and calibrated to microdata. 
 The long-run real effects of monetary shocks are estimated to be substantial. 
 Demand–supply interactions are key to explaining the long-run real effects. 
 Larger monetary expansions and restrictions are less effective in the long run. 
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